Page 169 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

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the ships and many men were suffering from scurvy (187 on the Victorious alone). But
the Dutch allowed the sick to go ashore for medical care, while they commenced with
provisioning the British squadron. 30
In a proclamation issued on 22 June Elphinstone and Craig directly appealed to the
Cape citizens: they were offered British protection and invited to negotiate directly with
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the British. The Council of Policy was very perturbed about this: negotiations with
the British ceased, the squadron received no more supplies and all horses, oxen and
other draught animals were removed from Simon’s Bay and Fish Hoek. On 28 June
Elphinstone ordered the three VOC ships anchored in Simon’s Bay “not to move from
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this place” and nine days later the British seized these ships. The Dutch protested, but
due to the inadequate fortifications of Simon’s Town they were powerless against the
strong naval force. During the night of 29 June the Dutch evacuated Simon’s Town and
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withdrew to Muizenberg. As British supplies were starting to run low (from 2 July
rations were cut by a third) and negotiations failed, they knew they would have to fight.
4. Attack on Muizenberg
In the late eighteenth century, amphibious operations were difficult and the attacker
was exceptionally vulnerable during the attempted landing as no specialised vessels
were yet developed. Though Simon’s Town would be difficult to hold in the face of
a large-scale amphibious attack, its evacuation was a blessing for the British and its
lack of proper defences was a grave Dutch military error. The British therefore easily
achieved a crucial operational objective – to establish a beachhead on foreign soil.
The route between Simon’s Town and Cape Town was blocked by Muizenberg, re-
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ferred to by Elphinstone as the “Thermopylae of the Cape Peninsula”. It was a natural
defensive position: with a narrow pass between the mountain and the sea, the high face
of the Steenberg Mountain to the west (running southwest along the sea and north-
wards), and the Sandvlei (marshes) to the east. Both Elphinstone and Craig realised
the importance of Muizenberg in their military planning. Though they considered a
flanking movement via Constantia if they failed to take Muizenberg, this was virtually
impossible due to the rugged mountainous terrain, marshland and distances. In the end
both reiterated that the only option was for Muizenberg to be taken as the terrain did
not allow for other viable military options. But, it had to be a joint operation, with the
advance ashore supported by naval gunfire.
In preparation of an attack on Muizenberg, the Navy took soundings to establish if it
would be possible for the ships to approach to within three-quarters of a mile from the

29 Perin (ed), Keith Papers, I, Elphinstone – Admiralty, 17/6/1795, p. 276.
30 P. Erskine, ‘Admiral Elphinstone’s Naval Task Force 1795-1796. The Memorabilia of the first British
Occupation’, in Antiques in South Africa, 12 (1983), p. 86.
31 Theal (ed), Records of the Cape Colony, I, Elphinstone and Craig – Dundas, 27/6/1795, p. 82.
32 Theal (ed), Records of the Cape Colony, I, Proclamation by Elphinstone, 28/6/1795, p. 90.
33 CA VC68, Brieven en Bijlagen, pp. 666-7 and C231, Resolutiën, 2/7/1795, pp. 378-380.
34 C.J. de Villiers, Die Britse Vloot aan die Kaap, , 1795-1803 (Unpublished MA, University of Cape
Town, 1967), pp.11-12.