Page 168 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

168 XXXIX Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

As they had received no recent reliable news on the latest events in Europe, the Cape
government faced a predicament. Britain and the Netherlands were supposed to be al-
lies, but their most recent information suggested that the Netherlands could suddenly
change sides. To complicate matters they could not count on the loyalty and support of
the whole garrison and the burghers. The resolve and loyalty of the burgher population
were weakened by internal strife and division as the interior was in turmoil and gross
dissatisfaction existed with the VOC control of the Cape. Most of the burghers and
soldiers supported the Dutch Patriotten and were opposed to the stadtholdership, while
the officers and VOC officials were mainly loyal supporters of the Oranje Partij. The
Garrison Commander, Colonel Robert Jacob Gordon, was an ardent Oranjeman and
was known for his pro-British sentiments. The British assumed that he might welcome
a British take over and that the garrison could be persuaded to change sides if Gordon
received assistance. 21
On 14 June two British officers went to Cape Town to deliver the Prince of Orange’s
letter as well as a report by Elphinstone and Craig on the situation in the Netherlands.
22
The Council of Policy was divided: Gordon considered the British as allies, while other
members thought that the British should not land at the Cape as the letter was signed by
a fugitive prince in a foreign country and their loyalty was to a country, not to party. 23
The Council replied that British assistance would be appreciated in case of a French
24
attack, but that the Cape was capable of defending itself. In a further attempt to con-
vince the Council to hand over authority, Craig also visited Cape Town on 19 June, but
again the commitment to defend the Cape and the lawful constitution of the Netherlands
25
was reiterated. The Dutch allowed British officers visiting the Cape to walk around
and collect valuable intelligence on the political and military situation – as Elphinstone
26
confirmed, it was their duty to “gain as much intelligence possible”.
Elphinstone knew that his force was inadequate (without guns, mortars, artillerists,
engineers or siege equipment) and notified Dundas that success would be very difficult
27
to achieve if the Dutch retreated behind their fortifications. Negotiations continued,
but as it was evident that the Cape would not just be handed over, on 18 June Elphin-
stone dispatched the HMS Sphynx to San Salvador to summon Major General Clarke’s
28
force. The British were in a precarious position. Besides having insufficient force,
they had no foothold ashore, a desperate shortage of water and provisions on some of

21 Theal (ed), Records of the Cape Colony, I, Elphinstone Journal, pp. 58-60.
22 CA C231, Elphinstone and Craig Report – Council of Policy, 13/6/1795 attached to Resolutiën, 13-
14/6/1795, pp. 152-156.
23 CA C231, Resolutiën, 13-14/6/1795, pp. 165-166.
24 CA C231, Council of Policy – Elphinstone and Craig 14/6/1795, attached to Resolutiën, 13-14/6/1795,
pp. 167-168.
25 Theal (ed), Records of the Cape Colony, I, Council of Policy – Craig, 19/6/1795, p. 65.
26 NAUK WO1/323, Journal of G.K. Elphinstone, June 1795, pp. 254-255
27 Perin (ed), Keith Papers, I, Elphinstone – Dundas, 17/6/1795, p. 273.
28 Perin (ed), Keith Papers, I, pp. 218 and 220.