Page 165 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

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Many examples of poor command and control also exist: the Antwerp debacle of
1809 is was a command and control failure. The fact that the greatest British amphibi-
ous operation to that date (involving 40 000 troops) resulted in a dismal failure with
heavy losses could be ascribed to bad intelligence, the poor doctrinal grasp of the com-
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manders and inadequate co-operation between naval and land forces . Yet, despite all
the potential difficulties, British forces succeeded at the Cape due to successful joint
operations and good command. Perhaps command is an art to be mastered, requiring
special knowledge, good intuition, intelligence, and reason. Commanding and motivat-
ing people in war are extremely complicated processes and successful practitioners of
the art of command were “a special breed of men, distinguished by strength, will and
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[often] flair” .
This article primarily deals with the cooperation between British naval and land forc-
es during the British occupation of the Cape of Good Hope in 1795.

2 Strategic setting and opposing forces
After the French had successfully invaded the Netherlands late in 1794, the Dutch
Stadtholder (William V, Prince of Orange) fled to England early in 1795. A new Dutch
State was created known as the Batavian Republic. It immediately became an ally of
France and an enemy of Britain. Since the British feared the Cape might fall into French
hands, impede on British commerce and become a base for French privateers much
anxiety existed amongst the directors of the English East India Company (EEIC). On 4
January 1795 Sir Francis Baring, Chairman of the Company, emphasised that the Cape
is important for the refreshment of EEIC ships and added that whoever is “… master of
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the Cape will be able to protect or annoy our ships” . He requested the Secretary of State
for War, Henry Dundas (afterwards Lord Melville), to make an attempt on the Cape of
Good Hope as they might surprise the defenders and it could easily be conquered. But
he added: if the Cape is lost, there is no substitute. 7
After war with the Netherlands broke out, Britain captured various Dutch possessions
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all over the world, in the “interest of its own naval supremacy”. In the case of the Cape
the resolve to control it was unwavering the British were afraid that the “feather in the
hands of Holland” would become a “sword in the hands of France”. On the insistence
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of British politicians, the exiled Prince William of Orange wrote a letter to the ruling
Dutch East India Company (VOC) authorities at the Cape on 7 February 1795. The letter

4 Directorate of Naval Staff Duties, The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine (London, 1995),
p. 129.
5 Blumenson and Stokesbury, Masters of the Art of Command, p. x.
6 National Archive of the United Kingdom, Kew (hereafter NAUK), WO1/323, Baring – Dundas,
4/1/1795, pp. 1-2.
7 See the correspondence between Baring and Dundas in G.M Theal (ed.), Records of the Cape Colony
from 1793 to December 1796, Volume I (London, 1897), pp. 19-23.
8 A. Allardyce, Memoir of the Honourable George Keith Elphinstone (Edinburgh, 1882), p. 85.
9 M. Boucher and N. Penn, Britain at the Cape, 1795-1803 (Houghton, 1992), Blankett – Napean,
25/1/1795, p. 22.