Page 161 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

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duke Charles and General Mack. Despite all efforts, the coordination of the Austrian
and Russian proved to be a total failure on the autumn campaign. Kutuzov’s Russians
arrived almost twenty days later than expected. This setback had been so impressive
that, there were some gossip about the imbecility of the Austrian and Russian generals,
who forgot the difference of 13 days between the Julian and the Gregorian calendar. As
a matter of fact in the age before the train and motorization calculating the time of the
mobilization, concentration and marches was almost impossible considering that these
armies had 100 000 men . The poor roads of Eastern Europe also made these calcula-
tions very difficult.
Such a great coalition against Napoleon was formed only in 1813. The strategic situ-
ation however had changed radically since 1805. In 1813 the alliance was complete
against France because every major continental had joined it and the Russian army had
already been in Poland and Silesia. The theatre of operations was relatively small (Sax-
ony and Silesia) which eased to make realistic and well-timed arrangements. The Aus-
trian Chief-of-staff, Radetzky and the Russian Chief-of-staff, Toll learned much from
the previous failures of coalition warfare. Their plans were constructed separately but
they reached roughly the same. Radetzky could make a final coordination even with the
dying Scharnhorst in Prague so the greatest military “brains” of all the three major pow-
ers participated in it.
These plans were cautious, realistic and defensive, calculating the nature of the coali-
tion warfare. The plan was signed on 12 July 1813 in the conference at Schloss Trachen-
berg, on which King Frederick William III of Prussia, Czar Alexander I of Russia and
the Swedish Crown Prince Bernadotte were present. When Austria joined the coalition,
the Radetzky-plan had been already incorporated in the Trachenberg-project. Finally,
this plan proved to be victorious over Napoleon.

Joint leadership
During the series of wars and coalition from 1792 to 1815 there was a string of al-
lied leaders of the joint forces. Achieving the war aims seemed always easier: “…when
only one General would direct the whole machine, whose orders had to be followed by
the commanders of the various army corps” – as the Prussian king offered the Duke of
Brunswick to Vienna as allied commander in chief.
Here we can mention only the most important figures in the main theatre of opera-
tions. Choosing one person commanding an international army is always difficult, and
might provoke serious offences or even breakup within the alliance. The person of the
allied commander in chief was a rather political than military choice in every age.
Austria, Prussia and Russia tried several types of military personalities to lead their
combined armies. The most obvious choice was the mightiest sovereign to lead the joint
forces with his full authority like Napoleon or Frederick the Great. Tsar Alexander tried
himself as military commander but the result had been disastrous, leading to the defeat at
Austerlitz. We can also mention in this category the short-lived command of the Swed-
ish King, the unstable Gustav Adolf IV, who was to command a joint Russian-Hanoveri-
an-British-Swedish army in 1805. The military career of this monarch was also short and