Page 162 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

162 XXXIX Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

inglorious. After one month of hesitation, the king abdicated from his post and recalled
his army to defend the borders of Swedish Pomerania against the Prussian threat.
Habsburg archdukes (there were many and almost all held military commands) could
be also obvious choices. In 1805 Archduke Ferdinand was nominally appointed as CIC
above the Russian-Austrian forces in Germany because of the destruction of the Aus-
trian Army in the trap of Ulm. It is undisputable that Archduke Charles was the most
talented and charismatic Austrian leader but he resigned after the defeats of 1809. His
name was propounded by Alexander in 1813 to command but rejected by Francis and
Metternich. They needed a diplomat soldier not the autonomous and wayward Charles,
so their choice fixed on Prince Schwarzenberg, who used to be ambassador in Paris and
St. Petersburg. His role and performance as CIC of the allied army have been disputed
since 1813 and it would deserve a whole lecture.
There were obviously experienced solders too, who were trusted commanding joint
forces not because their bloodlines and diplomatic skills but their military ability. The
Duke of Brunswick was an obvious choice leading the Austro-Prussian Army because
of his successes against the French army during the seven years war, but in 1792 during
the Champagne campaign this old professional failed. To do him justice, he had to ac-
complish a very daring plan.
In 1799 Paul I was willing to submit their troops in Italy to an Austrian general, but
Emperor Francis and Chancellor Thugut shared the mistrust toward their own com-
manders. On the other hand the Russian Field Marshall Suvorov enjoyed such repu-
tation that Vienna insisted on his person as Commander in Chief in Italy and he was
promoted to an Austrian Field Marshall giving him full authority over K. k. Troops. It
might be interesting that a great power willingly disclaims its right to nominate a joint
commander but the decision of Francis and Thugut proved to be right in the short run. It
is also remarkable that the Russian troops comprised only the quarter of the combined
forces. Suvorov however was a man of determination, will-power and dynamism. These
were precisely the abilities which were usually missing from the Austrian generals. At
the same time the Austrian staff work and logistics proved essential to the Russians in
Lombardy and Piedmont during the successful campaign of 1799.
The short Austrian-Russian cooperation during the war of second coalition proved
a good example to the case when joint warfare could be more effective than the strug-
gle of a single power and not just because their forces were added together. There were
two military cultures which represented the very opposite virtues. The Russian Army,
who taught the lessons of war at the end of the 18 century against Turks and Poles,
th
hold some Asiatic elements. Russian soldiers were very brave and austere, but the Su-
vorovian art of war had been rather primitive concentrating only to attack the enemy
regardless of its strength and position. On the other hand Austria maintained a slow and
bureaucratic war machine after the seven years war, which meant that the Austrian sol-
ders were usually well paid, fed and equipped but the first goal of the generals and staff
officers were preserving the army from the defeat not the victory. Suvorov’s élan galva-
nized this rusty machine, but his headless run from Brescia to Turin would have been a
logistic failure without the work of his Austrian Quartiermeister-stab-chef, Marquis de