Page 159 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

159
ActA
Rheinbund thus held the overall command over German and Italian armies. There was
no question but they served in the Grand Armée under tight French control and were
incorporated in corps which were commanded by French marshals or generals. It was
only on brigade or divisional level which they could enjoy any independency. Only the
military (naval) cooperation with Spain during the third war of coalition resembled a
real alliance. Napoleon, however, in 1808 tried to make a satellite state from Spain. As a
matter of fact the emperor himself made a number of gestures for his non-French troops
to ease the feeling of submission. They were also awarded with the Order of Honor and
the emperor held battle speeches to the German soldiers. Hessen cavalry guarded the
imperial headquarters during the Russian campaign, and the loyalty of many non-French
units even after Leipzig was remarkable. It was unimaginable, however, to the vassal
states to enforce, by any means their interests with France or might contradict the Napo-
leonic claims that by 1813 there were unbearably severe.
On paper by 1812 the Napoleonic Empire was surrounded by a stable system of alli-
ance. The three defeated great powers, Austria, Prussia and Russia, were forced to join
the Napoleonic system.
After Tilsit, in the war of 1809 Russia practically failed to fulfill her duty as a French
ally against Austria. Three years later Emperor Francis and King Frederick William
were obliged to send troops against Russia but it was known that from the Austrian and
Prussian troops limited assistance to expect. In 1812 however, the two powers, which
were sorely needed for strategic reasons, Sweden and the Ottoman Empire finally could
not be counted on.
The “military cooperation” or “coalition warfare” was not Napoleon’s cup of tea. The
allied powers against France had to be dealt with every difficulty of the cooperation. The
allied sovereigns, politicians and soldiers faced enormous problems to cooperate with
each other. For example in the autumn of 1805 the Coalition of Britain, Sweden, Russia,
Austria and Naples had to coordinate the movements of troops from Pomerania to Sicily.
The rough plans of the campaign pressuring on France in various theaters proved to be
a complete failure. In the end the French triumphed at Austerlitz but England won the
naval battle of Trafalgar however the Royal Navy fought on its own.
This lecture, however, did not intend to examine the obvious political frictions in the
fragile structure of the coalitions from 1792 and 1815. Hereby I rather try to make a short
analysis the types and working of the military cooperation between the great powers.
Firstly I recommend four points of view: 1. The degree of military involvement, 2. The
joint war planning 3. The joint leadership 4. Cooperation of different military cultures.

Involvements
At the lowest level of the involvement we find the “clausewitzian” way, sending
auxiliary force to an ally in a distant war. This was typical in the 18 century warfare
th
and then it could be done without a formal declaration of war as well. Sending a corps
of 10-15 000 men was just a political tool of putting pressure. It was the distant Rus-
th
sia, whose rulers could afford such whims by the end of the 18 century in the middle
of the French wars. Catherine the Great played with the idea sending an army against