Page 160 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

160 XXXIX Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

the French, but his son Paul I in the spring of 1799 actually ordered his best generals,
Suvorov and Korsakoff to lead armies into Germany and Italy against the revolutionary
France. According to the defensive alliance treaty of 1792 (renewed in 1795 then 1799)
the Russian forces were to be regarded as auxiliaries at the free disposal of Austrians,
while Vienna would take on the responsibility for supply. The Russian war effort how-
ever had become much greater during the second war of coalition, but barely half a year
later, Paul took offense at Austria and Britain leaving the alliance immediately. Russia
completely switched side, Paul even sent off a Cossack force on an expedition towards
India.
The half-hearted Prussian and Austrian invasion against France during the first war
of coalition resembled a mixed “auxiliary force”, wherein both Prussia and Austria were
reluctant to play a decisive role. Both military powers held significant forces back due
to the Polish situation. To overcome the “disturbances in Paris” seemed an almost a
policing task not a military action. When France showed surprising resolution Prussia
and some minor power of the coalition preferred to step back rather than increase the
pressure. By 1795 Austria was left on her own in the continental war.
The Napoleonic way of warfare raised the bar from 1805. The Grande Armée occu-
pied vast territories, entered Vienna, Berlin and Moscow. The French emperor redesig-
nated the map of the continent. The Kingdom of Prussia was curtailed by Napoleon to
the status of a minor power as a consequence of her defeat. The Habsburg Empire got to
the eve of destruction after her crushing defeat in 1809. Latest by 1812 it was clear for
Alexander too, that even Russia had to use every effort to overcome Napoleon. The age
of Kabinettkrieg and the “auxiliary forces” came to an end.
From the hesitant and mutually distrustful cooperation the threatened monarchs were
obliged to move in the direction of a real coalition. Before they took the battlefield on 19
August 1813 the combined Army paraded in front of Alexander, Francis and Frederick
Wilhelm. Then followed a remarkable symbolic gesture: “the three allied sovereigns
nailed their respective colours together to the pole, in token of the firmness of their alli-
ance and the intimacy of their union” – according to a British observer. This ceremony
was to disperse the doubts from the past; that is one of the allied powers may quit the
coalition leaving the others let down against Napoleon.

The joint war planning
The foundations of military cooperation between powers are often cemented by mili-
tary conventions, but these agreements were famous for their vagueness even in the 20
th
Century.
Before the age of the telegraph, the radio or the phone the personal meetings of gen-
erals were essential when it came to coordination, but it might be important nowadays
as well. Ideally after a lengthy coordination between the generals and staff, the joint war
plans were finally approved by the allied sovereigns before the outbreak of the war. This
process was rather slow and complicated. In 1804, the Russo-Austrian military conven-
tion was signed in Petersburg on 6 November. In July 1805 was sent Alexander’s Aide
de Camp, General Winzingerode to Vienna coordinating the arrangements with Arch-