Page 158 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

158 XXXIX Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

Military alliances, coalitions and cooperation during
the French Revolutionary and napoleonic wars – a short

typology

Balazs LAZAR

he dramatic events which occurred in Europe between 1792 and 1815, the French
T and Napoleonic wars were also named War of the Coalitions traditionally. From
this label we could assume that the military cooperation played a very important role in
these wars.
Curiously enough that the two contemporary great military theoreticians, Clause-
witz and Jomini did not place too much emphasis on the coalition warfare. Clausewitz
himself seemed to keep the whole phenomena unimportant. “One country may support
another’s cause – said Clausewitz – but will never take it as seriously as it takes his
own.” The greater political and military cooperation which was forced by the Napo-
leonic threat was an exception. Generally only an auxiliary force would be sent to any
ally, but it operates under its own commander and it is dependent only on his own gov-
th
ernment. According to Clausewitz, the habits of the so called Kabinetkriege of the 18
century fit the best of the timeless political reality. “Nevertheless the old way was no
mere diplomatic archaism that reason could ignore, but a practise deeply rooted in the
frailties and shortcomings of human race”
Jomini was even shorter on this issue. It is better – said the Swiss military thinker – to
have allies than not.
Neither of the two, otherwise long-winded theoreticians touched the many ideologi-
cal and technical questions of the coalition warfare in their lengthy volumes.
What is the reason of this negligence? I think the answer to this question lays in the
admiration of the Napoleonic “blitzkrieg” warfare and the precise machine of the Grand
Armée. Jomini and Clausewitz both shared this feeling, and the coalition warfare was
famous for its hesitant and ineffective ways so from this point of view it was an antith-
esis of this kind of war.
In 1796 when he succeeded to overcome the troops of the piedmont-Austrian coali-
tion defeated them one-by-one, Napoleon himself summed up the troubles of the joint
operation shortly saying that one bad commander is better than two good.
The schemes (pattern) of the seven coalitional wars were usually very similar; the
revolutionary and the Napoleonic French fought against allied powers, which were or-
ganized by Britain. France during the first and second war of coalition was isolated, but
she had started to build a network of client states long before. Later, from the build-up
of the Napoleonic Empire we could find several allied (Italian, German, Polish) troops
in the Grande Armée. This “alliances” were any but cooperation of independent pow-
ers. Napoleon was not just Empire of France but the Italian king and Protector of the