Page 164 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

164 XXXIX Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

The “Thermopylae of the Cape Peninsula”:
key to capturing the Cape of Good Hope

Thean POTGIETER

1. Introduction
s British interests in India expanded during the late eighteenth century, India be-
A came important for British prosperity, but the sea route that linked Britain with
India was vulnerable. The Cape of Good Hope, located on the southern tip of Africa,
was literally halfway to the East and vital for maritime communications with the East.
The Cape was in Dutch hands and it was usually well-defended during the oft-fought
wars of the eighteenth century. In wartime, Britain was therefore very anxious about
the security of the Cape sea route and its very valuable trade with the East. In 1781
a British expedition to capture the Cape was thwarted by a French naval and military
force, and the British war effort in the East was impeded upon by the French-Dutch alli-
ance and their control of the Cape. After the French Revolutionary War commenced in
1792 Britain wished to ensure that it did not fall in French hands. Hence, when France
invaded the Netherlands Britain despatched a joint expeditionary force to take the Cape
of Good Hope by force.
Joint operations were very difficult during the late eighteenth century due to obsta-
cles such as logistics, the embarkation of troops, intelligence, co-ordination and time
scales. It probably is remarkable that, despite this, so many joint operations did suc-
ceed at the time . The British learned to master the techniques of amphibious warfare
1
and to respect the vital value of planning and preparation during the Seven Years’ War
(1756-1763) and the American War of Independence (1775-1783). Troops and equip-
ment had to be assembled and embarked, the organisation of the armed forces had to
be maintained during the voyage and troops had to be properly commanded and moved
with the assistance of the navy during the actual landings. The navy also had to provide
much needed gunfire support and forces ashore had to be supplied (with provisions, am-
munition and equipment) from naval and support vessels . As early as 1763 guidelines
2
to British officers already stipulated that when a landing site is decided upon, “the whole
3
command is given to a Sea Officer who conducts them to the place of landing …” .
Once the men were out of the boats and actually set their feet ashore, the Army com-
mander took over command of the soldiers. A good working relationship between these
commanders therefore had to exist throughout.

1 M. Blumenson and J.L. Stokesbury, Masters of the Art of Command (New York, 1975), p. 249.
2 S. Foster, Hit the Beach. The Drama of Amphibious Warfare (London, 2004), pp. 11-12.
3 Quoted in Foster, Hit the Beach, p. 13 from a 1763 publication: J. MacIntire, A Military Treatise on the
Discipline of Marine Forces when at Sea, Together with Short Instructions for Detachments Sent to At-
tack on Shore, p. 225.