Page 167 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

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ActA
militia and an extensive system of fortifications. Due to the financial plight of the VOC
the Cape Garrison was a depleted force in 1795 as the Württemberg Regiment (that was
stationed at the Cape) left for Batavia in 1792. The garrison consisted of only one regu-
lar infantry battalion (571 officers and men), the locally raised Pandoer Corps (about
200 strong), 57 infantrymen from depots of the Meuron and Württemberg Regiments, 44
sipahis (Malay infantry), an Artillery Corps (with 430 officers and men in total), as well
as the burgher militia infantry and cavalry (burghers between 16 and 60 were obliged to
do military service). The full-time soldiers amounted to roughly 1 302 officers and men,
while in total the defenders would not amount to much more than 3 600. 15
The Castle in Cape Town was the main fortification, but as its effectiveness was
doubtful, numerous smaller forts and batteries were erected around the Cape and in Table
Bay to create a system of defensive lines. Camps Bay had entrenchment and a battery
16
and in Hout Bay three batteries were constructed. In total around 400 artillery pieces
(some not properly mounted) and 19 ovens capable of producing 450 rounds of red-hot
17
shot in 14 minutes, were available to defend the Cape Peninsula. Although many forti-
fications were far from formidable with a limited field of fire, the system of fortifications
as a whole presented a major obstacle to any would-be attacker. A Dutch naval officer
(Captain De Jong) considered it “formidable”, stating if 2 500 soldiers were available to
18
defend the Cape it would be very difficult to take it from the sea. However, in False
Bay the defences were lacking. Only two small batteries (armed with four 24-pounders
and four 4-pounders each) with a limited field of fire were erected in Simon’s Bay (with
a good anchorage in a natural, sheltered bay). Hence, as British intelligence reports indi-
cated, False Bay was the ideal place for a hostile force to conduct a landing.

3. British arrival at the Cape and negotiations
The distressing news that a British expeditionary force arrived in False Bay reached
A.J. Sluysken (VOC Commissioner at the Cape and the highest politico-military author-
ity) late on 11 June 1795. The Cape Council of Policy immediately dispatched Lt Col
19
C.M.W. de Lille with 200 infantrymen and 100 artillerists to strengthen the Simon’s
Town garrison of 110 infantrymen and 50 gunners. A call-up also went out for the
burgher militia from the outlying districts to assist with the defence of the Cape, but the
20
response was poor.

15 See CA VC75, P.W. Marnitz, Verhaal van de Overgaave van de Kaap de Goede Hoop aan de Engelshen
door een Vriend der waarheid aldaar (Handwritten copy, 21/11/1796), pp. 33-35.; and Nel, Britse Ve-
rowering van die Kaap, pp. 23-25.
16 Cape Archive Depot (hereafter CA) C714, Bijlagen, 27/2/1792, pp. 69-75 and H.F. Nel, Die Britse Ve-
rowering van die Kaap in 1795 (Unpublished MA, University of Cape Town, 1967), pp. 15-19.
17 CA C704, Bijlagen. Generale Staat van Ammunitie Goederen van Oorlog, November 1792, pp. 105-
106.
18 C. de Jong, Reizen naar de Kaap de Goede Hoop, Ierland en Noorwegen, Volume II, (Haarlem, 1802),
p. 84.
19 CA C231, Resolutiën, 11/6/1795, pp. 130-132.
20 G.E. Cory, The Rise of South Africa (London, 1910), p. 56.