Page 170 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I
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170 XXXIX Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm
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beach. As naval gunfire support was very important for the assault on Muizenberg,
Elphinstone was concerned about the “shallowness of the water, the uncertainty of the
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wind”, and the effectiveness of his gunnery due to the effect of the long rolling swell.
But he reassured Craig that in right weather conditions (“a westerly wind with a smooth
sea”) his ships would be on their post within two hours. The landing of seamen with
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boats at Muizenberg was also considered, but it was disregarded as the commanders
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were convinced that the Dutch would not stand.
Muizenberg favoured the defender and the Dutch must have realised it was a cru-
cial position, as it controlled the link between False Bay and Cape Town and a number
of military specialists have identified Muizenberg as a point of strategic value. Good
Dutch preparations and stubborn resistance would have made it very difficult for the
British to take Muizenberg. Yet, only a portion of the Cape defenders (200 infantry, 120
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artillery, 200 mounted burghers and 150 pandours) were stationed here. Some of the
Dutch artillery officers were concerned about the position and wanted to improve it, but
Gordon thought it unnecessary as he considered the British to be friends. Furthermore,
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morale was low and the troops had no real trust in Gordon and in De Lille.
The British attack on Muizenberg commenced on 7 August with troops and two
battalions of seamen (roughly 1 600 men) marching from Simon’s Town, while four
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warships and a small gunboat sailed along the coast to Muizenberg, providing gunfire
support where possible. Though they lacked equipment and material, the British com-
manders were confident: British fire drove the Dutch from their piquet at Kalk Bay,
while ships bombarded Muizenberg with full broadsides, literally “thundering showers
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of shot” at the Dutch positions. Lieutenant Colonel De Lille, the Dutch commander at
Muizenberg, and his infantry fled in great confusion, leaving everything except five field
guns behind and retreated to Lochner’s Farm. Only a few gunners conducted some sort
of defence with two 24-pounders that were not properly mounted. The guns embedding
themselves into the sand and had to be redirected after every salvo, but the Dutch suc-
ceeded with a number of hits on the British warships. Eventually the artillerists were
forced to retreat by the ships’ broadsides. However, around the mountain and out of
range of the ships’ guns, some artillerymen and burghers made a stand and drove the
British van back to Muizenberg. 43
After the action at Muizenberg, Elphinstone had much praise for the conduct of his
35 Perin (ed), Keith Papers, I, Elphinstone Journal, 13 and 15/7/1795, pp. 334-335.
36 Brenthurst Library (hereafter BL), MS 344/3, Viscount Keith Papers, Craig – Elphinstone, 17/7/1795.
37 Perin (ed), Keith Papers, I, Elphinstone – Craig, 26/7/1795, pp. 336-338.
38 BL, MS 344/8. Memorandum, Craig – Elphinstone, 25/7/1795.
39 CA VC75, Marnitz, Verhaal van de Overgaave van de Kaap, p. 72 and Nel, Britse verowering van die
Kaap, pp. 86-87.
40 CA VC75, Marnitz, Verhaal van de Overgaave van de Kaap, pp. 68-72.
41 Theal (ed), Records of the Cape Colony, I, Elphinstone – Dundas, 18/8/1795, p. 114.
42 Boucher and Penn, Britain at the Cape, 1795-1803, Ross – Scott, 14/8/1795, p. 43.
43 NAUK ADM51/1136, Journal of the Proceedings Commodore Blankett, see August 1795, CA VC75, Mar-
nitz, Verhaal van de Overgaave van de Kaap, p. 303 and Nel, Die Britse verowering van die Kaap, p. 90.