Page 173 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

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(the Cape of Good Hope and Ceylon being the ones of most strategic importance) to
avert the threat to India. Indeed, during this conflict the remark Lord Palmerston would
make a few years later (1840) rang true: “Every country that has towns within cannon
shot of deep water will remember the operations of the British Fleet … whenever such
58
country has any differences with us”.
The success of the Elphinstone expedition was to a great extent due to the fact that it
was in accordance with Royal Navy wisdom concerning amphibious operations that had
59
evolved since Elizabethan times. A first emphasis was on a careful and secret plan-
ning process, without which such endeavours could easily be jeopardised. Elphinstone’s
thorough preparation, planning, organisational skill and control of the expedition were
crucial to its success. Effective co-operation between military and naval commanders
was another vital prerequisite. In this respect, Elphinstone had a good working relation-
ship with Craig. Their correspondence is proof of the open, co-operative spirit and em-
phatic trust that existed between them. A further requirement was for both the political
authority and the military commanders to have a clear understanding of what the objec-
tive was, since any deviation from the main purpose might have led to ruin. The objec-
tive therefore had to be maintained during the operation – which occurred. Elphinstone
and Craig thought that the Cape authorities would welcome the British force, but they
quickly realised military force would be necessary to achieve the objective. Clarke was
summoned from San Salvador even before the assault on Muizenberg. After Clarke’s
arrival the offensive immediately continued, which led to the Dutch capitulation.
Command of an expeditionary force at this time was demanding in the sense that
commanders had to have a clear strategic grasp and had to be able to make independ-
ent command decisions, often in the furthest corners of the world. Due to the distance
from Britain, command at the Cape had certain advantages and disadvantages. On the
one hand it was not possible to consult higher authority on important decisions, while
on the other hand commanders had more freedom of action on all matters. Elphinstone
received guidelines from the British government on policy and strategic matters, but
he had to make independent decisions at short notice and then reported on it. Good
examples are his timely decision to go for the military option in subduing the Cape
and to summon Clarke. Considering the distance from Britain, Elphinstone maintained
extremely good and regular communication with the Admiralty and the British Govern-
ment, often dispatching ships with special messages. He kept his superiors informed
about his decisions, explaining what alternatives existed and why he had chosen a spe-
cific course of action.
Amphibious expeditions are dependent on command of the sea or at least an over-
whelming naval force, while good intelligence and co-ordination between various ele-
60
ments of joint forces are also essential for success. Elphinstone and Craig went to much
trouble to gain intelligence and immediately shared it with each other. The fact that both

58 E. Grove (ed.), Great Battles of the Royal Navy (London, 1994), p. 153.
59 S.W. Roskill, The Strategy of Sea Power. Its Development and Application (London, 1962), pp. 28-29.
60 P.H. Colomb, Naval Warfare, Its Ruling Principles and Practice Historically Treated (London, 1891),
p. 220.