Page 171 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

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ActA
men, referring to Craig’s “… accustomed readiness and activity”, adding that Blankett
acted “… equally zealous”. He also commended a number of other officers in his report
to the Admiralty without expanding on his own role. 44
The British were astonished by the poor Dutch defences, the fact that they did not im-
prove the strong Muizenberg position and De Lille’s hastily retreat. Amongst the burgh-
ers there was much discontent, further fuelled by the fact that De Lille took a defensive
position behind Sandvlei, and promptly retreated to Wynberg when Craig resumed his
45
advance on 8 August. De Lille was removed from office as many in the Dutch camp
called him a traitor and considered the defence of the Cape sabotaged.
5. Further operations and dutch surrender
Maj B.C. van Baalen was put in charge at Wynberg, but he was also severely criti-
cised. His commander, Gordon, never visited Wynberg to prepare for a British attack
– he rather exerted himself in improving the Mouille Battery (Cape Town) on the north-
46
west, while the real threat was in the south-east. Neither Sluysken, nor Gordon, nor De
Lille made any significant effort to organise effective resistance before the withdrawal to
Wynberg. This might be due to their Orange sentiments and the fact that they were not
supporters of Revolutionary France.
The burghers perceived the Cape government as incapable of organising an adequate
defence and believed that they themselves should now organise the defence of the Col-
47
ony. At a public meeting Sluysken, however, assured the population that the Cape
would be defended as best as possible. In the meantime Elphinstone and Craig again
requested the Council of Policy to surrender the Cape to the British, but they refused.
48
The British now dug in at Muizenberg, but as the assaulting force, their hold was
precarious. They did not have access to agricultural products and were in urgent need
of supplies, they also lacked equipment, military reinforcements, field guns, cash and
transport – without it their advance through the difficult terrain would be extremely la-
borious. Their situation was alleviated by the Dutch lethargy. If the Dutch performed
persistent, well-organised attacks on their beachhead, things would have been very dif-
ficult for them. When the East Indiaman Arniston arrived from St Helena Island on 9
August with 400 additional troops from the EEIC, nine field guns and cash, they were
49
much relieved. Yet provisions and ammunition were still running very low despite
skilful administration of the shipboard stores. At a conference between the two British
commanders on 1 September, they resolved to wait another six days for Clarke and his

44 Allardyce, Memoir, p. 95.
45 CA VC76, H.D. Campagne, Memorie en bijzonderheden wegens overgave der Kaap de Goede Hoop
1795 (handwritten copy, 17/5/1797), pp. 52-3 and C.L. Neethling, Onderzoek van’t verbaal van A.J.
Sluysken, voormalige commissaris van Cabo de Goede Hoop, en verdediging van’t gedrag der Caap-
sche burgery (place of publication not indicated, 1797), pp. 52-54.
46 CA VC75, Marnitz, Verhaal van de Overgaave van de Kaap de Goede Hoop, pp. 353-357.
47 CA VC76, Campagne, Memorie en bijzonderheden wegens overgave der Kaap, p. 73.
48 CA C231, Resolutiën (Secrete), 12/8/1795, see Elphinstone and Craig – Council of Policy, 12/8/1795.
49 BL MS 344/12. Craig – Elphinstone, 9/8/1795