Page 212 - Il 1916 Evoluzione geopolitica, tattica e tecnica di un conflitto sempre più esteso - Atti 6-7 dicembre 2016
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212           il 1916. EvoluzionE gEopolitica, tattica E tEcnica di un conflitto sEmprE più EstEso



             The k.u.k. Army during 1916 – challenges & crisis



             Col. Christian ORtneR    1


             Comment on the strategic situation
             of the Habsburg Empire in 1916
                   t the beginning of the third year of war the major differences in war
             A strategy between the Austro-Hungarian and German Supreme Com-
             mand were already clearly visible. The strained personal relations between
             the two Chiefs of Staff, Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf (1852-1925) and Erich
             von Falkenhayn (1862-1922), was reflected in their mutual reluctance to coop-
             erate and the lack of a joint plan for their further operations. The German Su-
             preme Command independently coordinated the German troops on the var-
             ious theatres of war, the Austro-Hungarian Supreme Command acted more
             or less alone as well, although the unlucky operations of the Austro-Hungarian
             troops – due to personnel and material weaknesses – in the north-east and
             in the Balkans must have been of great importance to the German Supreme
             Command.
                Relations deteriorated further at the end of 1915/beginning of 1916
             when both allies hoped to accomplish different objectives. After the defeat of
             Serbia, Conrad tried to occupy Montenegro, destroy the Italian bridge-
             heads at Durazzo and Valona, and force the French Orient Army out of the
             area of Salonika. Falkenhayn was little interested in  the  developments  in
             the Balkans. Instead, he wanted to bring about victory in the West, at Ver-
             dun. Consequently, two different strategies were chosen in 1915/16. For the
             k.u.k. Army, the defeat of Montenegro was of high strategic value. During
             the autumn of 1915, following the joint German-Austrian-Hungarian-Bulgarian
             campaign against the Kingdom of Serbia, the military situation on the Balkans
             shifted in favour of the Central Powers. Despite the success of the combined
             army group in Serbia under the command of the German Field Marshall Au-
             gust von Mackensen (1849-1945), the offensive largely came to a halt after
             the establishment of a land bridge considered of strategic significance to the
             agonizing Ottoman Empire – which was to be supplied with ordnance via the



             1  Director of the Museum and Institute of Military History of Wien
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