Page 214 - Il 1916 Evoluzione geopolitica, tattica e tecnica di un conflitto sempre più esteso - Atti 6-7 dicembre 2016

214 il 1916. EvoluzionE gEopolitica, tattica E tEcnica di un conflitto sEmprE più EstEso

meanwhile functioning railway connection. Though the Serbian Army was in a
state of disintegration, it was not yet completely obliterated. Thousands of Serbi-
an soldiers, either as individuals or in closed formations, were heading toward
the Adriatic harbours on the Albanian coast, either to unite with the Italian units
deployed there or to be evacuated by the Italian Navy. On their return march,
many Serbs were also taken in by the Montenegrin Army, reinforcing their de-
fensive positions on Montenegro’s West and South-West border. Although Mon-
tenegro had also suffered significant losses during the fighting in 1914, it still
had an operational army totalling some 53,000 combatants. Together with the
2
forces concentrated in the Cattaro area, and in particular the Lovcen massif, the
Montenegrin Army was still a factor to be reckoned with on the West Balkans.
For the Imperial and Royal Army High Command, the permanent threat posed
to the Austro-Hungarian naval base in the Bay of Cattaro, deemed highly signif-
icant for the Austro-Hungarian naval warfare due to its strategic position near
the allied sea blockade set up in Otranto, was to tip the scales in favour of an
offensive against Montenegro. Especially the Montenegrin coastal artillery in
its tunnelled positions was an obstacle to the safe use of the naval base. The
plan, however, did not merely provide for a limited offensive. After eliminating
the Montenegrin heavy artillery on Lovcen and capturing Centinje, operations
were to continue along the Albanian coast toward the South, to also take out the
Serbian and Italian units stationed near Durazzo and Valona.
Understandably, a significant number of forces had to be gathered for the
planned venture. The k.u.k. 3 Army under General Hermann Kövess´ (1854-
rd
1924) command was the most evident choice, for it had taken part in the cam-
paign against Serbia and its units were already in place in Serbia and at the
border with Montenegro. The 3 Army, however, was still under the control of
rd
Mackensen’s army group, so that any further planning had to be coordinated
with the German ally. But, as already mentioned, the German Chief of Staff
Falkenhayn, however, was focusing his military attention on the German West-
ern front (Verdun), and also regarded the allied threat from the so-called “Sarrail
Army” stationed near Salonika as significant, so that he was unwilling to dis-
patch any troops for the offensive against Montenegro and Albania. In further
consequence, the diverging opinions of the two allied army commands caused
serious irritations which eventually led to a rupture between the two command-

2 Österreich-Ungarns letzter Krieg, ed. Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung und
Österreichisches Kriegsarchiv, Vienna 1930-1938, volume III, p. 565