Page 216 - Il 1916 Evoluzione geopolitica, tattica e tecnica di un conflitto sempre più esteso - Atti 6-7 dicembre 2016

216 il 1916. EvoluzionE gEopolitica, tattica E tEcnica di un conflitto sEmprE più EstEso

ers, when Austro-Hungarian Chief of Staff declared the military convention for
the conquest of Serbia signed on 6 September 1915 null and void, and placed
the 3 Army under the direct command of the Imperial and Royal Army High
rd
Command. It is quite obvious that Conrad’s actions aimed at underlining not
3
only the significance of the Austro-Hungarian war theatres to the German allies,
in this particular case the Western Balkans, but also to an equal extent the inde-
pendence of his own military planning and operations. However, the operation
had to be executed by the k.u.k. Army independently. Immediately after the
separation of the k.u.k. 3 Army on 20 December 1915, preparations began
rd
th
for the offensive against Montenegro. The time factor played an important role,
since the units designated for the operation were planned for another cam-
paign, scheduled to start as early as March/April 1916 (“Strafexpedition”).
According to the chain of command, all troops stationed at the West border of
Montenegro were to be placed under the “Commanding General in Bosnia,
Herzegovina and Dalmatia (BHD)” Stephan Sarkotic (1859-1939). The XIX.
Corps under Ignaz Trollman (1860-1919) was to lead the decisive operation
against the Lovcen massif, and several operative groups consisting of divisions
and brigades, as well as the mobile units of the naval base, were placed under
his command.
4
Apart from the main thrust against the Lovcen, the operational plan also
provided for movements at the Northern and Western border of Montenegro, to
prevent any shifting of Montenegrin units into the Lovcen area. The main thrust in
the attack area was to be delivered by some 25 infantry battalions, with anoth-
er five battalions standing by as operational reserve. Based on the assessment
of the XIX. Corps, this was to achieve an infantry superiority of approximately
two to one. Despite this significant concentration of infantry, the success of the
operation seemed far from guaranteed. Especially the French and Russian-made
Montenegrin defence batteries in tunnelled and well-hidden positions, in con-
junction with equally covered machinegun positions presented the attackers with
a defence force to be seriously reckoned with. The 3 Army Command had
rd
been aware of this difficulty beforehand, and had promised to assign substan-
tial artillery support to the XIX. Corps. To build up artillery superiority, Imperial
5

3 Cramon August von, Unser österreichisch-ungarischer Bundesgenosse im Weltkriege. Erin-
nerungen aus meiner vierjährigen Tätigkeit als bevollmächtigter General beim k.u.k. Armee-
oberkommando, Berlin 1920, p.45
4 ÖSTA/KA NFA 3. Armee, Op.No. 8058
5 Enne Peter, Die österreichisch-ungarische Offensive gegen Montenegro 1916 unter besonderer