Page 218 - Il 1916 Evoluzione geopolitica, tattica e tecnica di un conflitto sempre più esteso - Atti 6-7 dicembre 2016
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218           il 1916. EvoluzionE gEopolitica, tattica E tEcnica di un conflitto sEmprE più EstEso


             and Royal War Navy units were also assigned to the XIX. Corps; though they
             consisted of several older ships, their weaponry of 12-24 cm guns and their
             independence from external resupply and deployment space presented a signif-
             icant reinforcement. In addition, Army and Navy aircraft, observation balloons,
             and searchlights were provided for artillery observation and reconnaissance.
                                                                                   6
             The air force, which also included German some army aviators, was to play
             a particular role in the reconnaissance of enemy positions and in updating the
             artillery’s target coordinates.
                Especially the infantry and artillery offensive was met with considerable dif-
             ficulties in the first days of January 1916. The geographical conditions were
             dominated by pathless karst, which was, on top of that, particularly arid. In
             early 1916, the light railway rails already under construction in Herzegovina
             and in the Cattaro district were not yet operational. As a result, wagons had
             to  be  used  for  transport,  which  in  turn  depended  on  passable  routes.  Very
             often the last kilometres to the deployment areas had to be covered with pack
             animals. The  consequence of  such  intensive  utilization of wagons and  pack
             animals, however, was that a large part of the load capacity had to be used
             to supply the pack animals themselves – since winter weather conditions meant
             that no soilage was available on site. The result was a continuous undersupply
             of the troops in the deployment areas, and a great part of the winter protection
             equipment and other supply goods failed to reach the troops in time before the
             launch of the offensive.  Since the 3  Army command had requested the earliest
                                             rd
                                  7
             possible onset of the offensive, but the general deployment had been halted and
             supply lines had to be installed, the launch of the offensive was scheduled for
             January 4 . The offensive, however, would also have to wait for clear weather
                      th
             that would allow for efficient artillery monitoring, since a precise artillery impact
             was deemed essential for the attack on the Lovcen. 8
                In the end, the attack began on January 7 , 1916 in the area of the northern
                                                     th
              group to create the necessary conditions for an advance in the middle section.
              In the early morning of January 8 , the offensive artillery suddenly began its
                                            th
              preparatory bombardment of the enemy positions. Apart from the heavy siege
              artillery, the heavy guns from the units of the Imperial and Royal War Navy


                Berücksichtigung der Operation über den Lovcen und des Zusammenbruchs der montenegrini-
                schen Armee, Diploma thesis at the University of Vienna, Vienna 2008, p.81 f.
             6  Österreich-Ungarns letzter Krieg, volume IV, p.47
             7  ÖSTA/KA/NFA 3. Armee Op.No. 8249
             8  ÖSTA/KA NFA XIX. Korps OpNo. 643/9 1915
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