Page 224 - Il 1916 Evoluzione geopolitica, tattica e tecnica di un conflitto sempre più esteso - Atti 6-7 dicembre 2016
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224 il 1916. EvoluzionE gEopolitica, tattica E tEcnica di un conflitto sEmprE più EstEso
extremely high during the recent battles.
In those five battles the Austro-Hungarian Army had lost more than 100
000 men, a loss which could almost not be recouped. This disadvantage was
expected to raise serious problems in all further Italian offensives soon to begin.
The biggest military threat for the Austro-Hungarian Army emerged in the
north-east. In spring, the Entente had considered launching an offensive at the
same time in both the west and the east to win back the military initiative. In the
west, the German attack at Verdun interfered with the French intentions, and at
the South-west Front the Italian government asked urgently for support during
the South Tyrol Offensive. The Russian Army therefore felt obliged to adopt an
offensive strategy. As opposed to what had originally been planned for the
Russian West Front, the Russian Southwest Front under the command of General
Alexej Brussilow (1853-1926) was to stage an accompanying attack. On June
4 , 1916, four armies with heavy artillery carried out the offensive. The largely
th
fortified Austro-Hungarian positions were widely destroyed and the troops sim-
ply overrun. On June 10 , the area where the lines had collapsed was 35 x 48
th
km in extent. The Austro-Hungarian Army was already in a terrible state after the
breakthrough at Luck when, on June 10 , the front line of the Austro-Hungarian
th
7 Army further south was ripped open at Okna. It turned out that the resistance
th
of regiments that were mostly staffed by Slav soldiers, weakened especially
quickly and exacerbated the crisis. Quickly gathered Allied Forces reserves
were supposed to stabilise the Situation with a relief attack in Wolhynien; the
recapture of Luck failed, however. On June 17 the Russians took Czernowitz
th
and forced the Austro-Hungarian troops to surrender the Bukowina. Although
in July 1916 the North-East Front was again quite stable, the casualties of the
Austro-Hungarian Army were disastrous. They totalled 475 000 men, among
them 226 000 prisoners. Rumania’s entry into the war on the Entente’s side on
August 27 , 1916 must be seen in context with the “Disaster at Luck”. 11
th
The strategic position of Rumania required the rapid elimination of the new
enemy but, because of the losses incurred during the Brussilow Offensive, no
reinforcement troops were available. The Entente decided to pursue a defensive
strategy until this discrepancy in forces had been improved.
But Rumania took advantage of this weakness and, on the day of the dec-
laration of war, invaded Transylvania, held only by a small number of defence
troops. In a joint operation the German 9 Army (Falkenhayn) and the Aus-
th
11 Ortner M. Christian, Die k.u.k. Armee und ihr letzter Krieg, Wien 2013, p. 91

