Page 224 - Il 1916 Evoluzione geopolitica, tattica e tecnica di un conflitto sempre più esteso - Atti 6-7 dicembre 2016
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224           il 1916. EvoluzionE gEopolitica, tattica E tEcnica di un conflitto sEmprE più EstEso


              extremely high during the recent battles.
                In those five battles the Austro-Hungarian Army had lost more than 100
              000 men, a loss which could almost not be recouped. This disadvantage was
              expected to raise serious problems in all further Italian offensives soon to begin.
                The biggest military threat for the Austro-Hungarian Army emerged in the
              north-east. In spring, the Entente had considered launching an offensive at the
              same time in both the west and the east to win back the military initiative. In the
              west, the German attack at Verdun interfered with the French intentions, and at
              the South-west Front the Italian government asked urgently for support during
              the South Tyrol Offensive. The Russian Army therefore felt obliged to adopt an
              offensive strategy. As opposed to what had originally been planned for the
              Russian West Front, the Russian Southwest Front under the command of General
              Alexej Brussilow (1853-1926) was to stage an accompanying attack. On June
              4 , 1916, four armies with heavy artillery carried out the offensive. The largely
               th
              fortified Austro-Hungarian positions were widely destroyed and the troops sim-
              ply overrun. On June 10 , the area where the lines had collapsed was 35 x 48
                                   th
              km in extent. The Austro-Hungarian Army was already in a terrible state after the
              breakthrough at Luck when, on June 10 , the front line of the Austro-Hungarian
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              7  Army further south was ripped open at Okna. It turned out that the resistance
               th
              of regiments that were mostly staffed by Slav soldiers, weakened especially
              quickly and exacerbated the crisis. Quickly gathered Allied Forces reserves
              were supposed to stabilise the Situation with a relief attack in Wolhynien; the
              recapture of Luck failed, however. On June 17  the Russians took Czernowitz
                                                        th
              and forced the Austro-Hungarian troops to surrender the Bukowina. Although
              in July 1916 the North-East Front was again quite stable, the casualties of the
              Austro-Hungarian Army were disastrous. They totalled 475 000 men, among
              them 226 000 prisoners. Rumania’s entry into the war on the Entente’s side on
              August 27 , 1916 must be seen in context with the “Disaster at Luck”. 11
                       th
                The strategic position of Rumania required the rapid elimination of the new
              enemy but, because of the losses incurred during the Brussilow Offensive, no
              reinforcement troops were available. The Entente decided to pursue a defensive
              strategy until this discrepancy in forces had been improved.
                But Rumania took advantage of this weakness and, on the day of the dec-
              laration of war, invaded Transylvania, held only by a small number of defence
              troops. In a joint operation the German 9  Army (Falkenhayn) and the Aus-
                                                    th

             11  Ortner M. Christian, Die k.u.k. Armee und ihr letzter Krieg, Wien 2013, p. 91
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