Page 228 - Il 1916 Evoluzione geopolitica, tattica e tecnica di un conflitto sempre più esteso - Atti 6-7 dicembre 2016
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228 il 1916. EvoluzionE gEopolitica, tattica E tEcnica di un conflitto sEmprE più EstEso
on the battlefield, encouraging individual initiative in combat as well as orders
from above. In the years before the war, emphasis was therefore placed on
14
training recruits as ‘Plänkler’ (ordinary infantrymen) for duty in the line of fire. It
was the responsibility of the ordinary infantrymen to win the battle, either with
firearms or with the bayonet if necessary. Their training included instruction
in the use of firearms, and recruits were drilled in the perfect handling of the
repeating rifle in every position and Situation. But it also comprised strenuous
15
Sports and gymnastic exercises to enhance every recruit’s physical stamina. This
way they were trained for tactical employment in various forms of skirmish line.
However, soldiers were not only physically trained; they had also to be mentally
fit. The section of the manual devoted to combat states that: “An aggressive,
well trained and well led infantry, imbued with physical and moral stamina, can
succeed in battle under the most difficult circumstances....” Later it adds:
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“... when the disheartening influence and heavy losses on the
battlefield after heavy infantry fighting threaten to break up both
sides, it is those with manly discipline and an iron will, strong
enough to withstand these impressions, who will triumph, contin-
uing to fight with imperturbable perseverance until the enemy is
forced to cease their resistance”.
17
This distinct emphasis on the moral and psychological aspects of war clearly
indicates the Chief of Staff Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf’s influence on the
development of the manual of 1911. In his handbook of tactics “Zum Studium
der Taktik” (‘On the Study of Tactics’), first published in 1898, Conrad had
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come to the conclusion that, added to the material effect of being under fire,
the noise of battle, the dying and wounded would have an even greater effect
on the troops’ morale, illustrating all too clearly the dangers of the battlefield
and thus diminishing the troops’ performance. Conrad’s observations on the
wars of 1866 (Austria against Prussia) and 1870-71 (the Franco-Prussian War)
culminated in his belief, included in the regulations of 1911, that a unit could
14 Österreich-Ungarns letzter Krieg, hg. Bundesministerium für Heerwesen und Kriegsarchiv, 7
Text- und 7 Kartenbände, Register, Wien 1930-1938, Bd. 1, p. 34.
15 Exerzierreglement für die k.u.k. Fußtruppen, Wien 1911, p. 61 ff.
16 Ibid, p. 174.
17 Ibid. p. 175.
18 Conrad von Hötzendorf, Franz, Zum Studium der Taktik. 1.Teil, Wien 1898, p. 111 ff.

