Page 228 - Il 1916 Evoluzione geopolitica, tattica e tecnica di un conflitto sempre più esteso - Atti 6-7 dicembre 2016
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228           il 1916. EvoluzionE gEopolitica, tattica E tEcnica di un conflitto sEmprE più EstEso


              on the battlefield, encouraging individual initiative in combat as well as orders
              from above.  In the years before the war, emphasis was therefore placed on
                        14
              training recruits as ‘Plänkler’ (ordinary infantrymen) for duty in the line of fire. It
              was the responsibility of the ordinary infantrymen to win the battle, either with
              firearms or with the bayonet if necessary. Their training included instruction
              in the use of firearms, and recruits were drilled in the perfect handling of the
              repeating rifle in every position and Situation.  But it also comprised strenuous
                                                      15
              Sports and gymnastic exercises to enhance every recruit’s physical stamina. This
              way they were trained for tactical employment in various forms of skirmish line.
              However, soldiers were not only physically trained; they had also to be mentally
              fit. The section of the manual devoted to combat states that: “An aggressive,
              well trained and well led infantry, imbued with physical and moral stamina, can
              succeed in battle under the most difficult circumstances....”  Later it adds:
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                      “... when the disheartening influence and heavy losses on the
                   battlefield after heavy infantry fighting threaten to break up both
                   sides,  it  is  those  with  manly  discipline  and  an  iron  will,  strong
                   enough to withstand these impressions, who will triumph, contin-
                   uing to fight with imperturbable perseverance until the enemy is
                   forced to cease their resistance”.
                                                17
                This distinct emphasis on the moral and psychological aspects of war clearly
              indicates the Chief of Staff Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf’s influence on the
              development of the manual of 1911. In his handbook of tactics “Zum Studium
              der Taktik” (‘On the Study of Tactics’),  first published in 1898, Conrad had
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              come to the conclusion that, added to the material effect of being under fire,
              the noise of battle, the dying and wounded would have an even greater effect
              on the troops’ morale, illustrating all too clearly the dangers of the battlefield
              and thus diminishing the troops’ performance. Conrad’s observations on the
              wars of 1866 (Austria against Prussia) and 1870-71 (the Franco-Prussian War)
              culminated in his belief, included in the regulations of 1911, that a unit could


             14  Österreich-Ungarns letzter Krieg, hg. Bundesministerium für Heerwesen und Kriegsarchiv, 7
                Text- und 7 Kartenbände, Register, Wien 1930-1938, Bd. 1, p. 34.
             15  Exerzierreglement für die k.u.k. Fußtruppen, Wien 1911, p. 61 ff.
             16  Ibid, p. 174.
             17  Ibid. p. 175.
             18  Conrad von Hötzendorf, Franz, Zum Studium der Taktik. 1.Teil, Wien 1898, p. 111 ff.
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