Page 230 - Il 1916 Evoluzione geopolitica, tattica e tecnica di un conflitto sempre più esteso - Atti 6-7 dicembre 2016

230 il 1916. EvoluzionE gEopolitica, tattica E tEcnica di un conflitto sEmprE più EstEso

lose up to 50% (!) of its men if the remainder could maintain their discipline and
not panic.
19
The Austro-Hungarian army entered the battles of 1914 with its forces drawn
up in the same way as they had been every year for general manoeuvres. Con-
rad’s conviction that an offensive was absolutely essential to defeat the enemy
in the east before they could fully deploy meant, for the troops, a massive push
forward - an offensive. This was to be either a direct engagement or ‘an attack
on a fortified position’. The direct engagement was preferable for practical
20
reasons. For the troops gradually deploying at the beginning of the war this
meant that, after leaving their rail transport and being integrated in a brigade
or division, they marched off towards the enemy. The infantry apparently took
no interest in reconnaissance, except to a limited extent in the immediate vicini-
ty. Reconnaissance was the responsibility of the cavalry, assembled in divisions
and employed by higher commands (corps and upwards). In 1914, these cav-
alry divisions were sent directly to the borders of the Empire to screen the Aus-
tro-Hungarian army’s march in the north-east (the Russian theatre) as much as
possible. The infantry regiments therefore took screening and reconnaissance
for granted. There were cavalry squadrons attached to infantry brigade and
divisional staffs, but they were so busy with orderly and messenger duty that
they hardly had any time for tactical reconnaissance.
Thus, the encounter with the enemy in August 1914 generally took place in
a haphazard fashion, although this was something which had been adequately
rehearsed in training for direct engagements. If the vanguard of an advanc-
21
ing regiment came upon enemy forces, whether an advance covering unit or a
combat unit prepared for defence, the main column immediately deployed and
charged forward. If the enemy was not clearly visible, the attack was launched
in the correct general direction. It should be noted that, in order to surround the
enemy - and this alone could assure a quick victory - the attacking flanks were
spread over a wide area so that the skirmish line was considerably ‘thinned
out’. If enemy resistance was minimal, the attack was conducted in manoeuvre
22

19 Ibid. p. 112.
20 Pitreich, August von, Die Entwicklung unseres Kampfverfahrens vom Kriegsbeginn bis zur
Gegenwart. In: Militärwissenschaftliche Mitteilungen 1935, Hefte 1-10, Wien 1935, P. 401-
416, 485-510, 577-594, 681-697, 757-774, P. 402.
21 Cf. Mast, Heinrich, Die Aufklärungstätigkeit der österr.-ung. Kavallerie bei Kriegsbeginn
1914, In: ÖMZ, Sonderheft 1918, 1968, p. 388-395.
22 Pitreich, Max, Lemberg 1914. Grundprobleme des Krieges, Wien 1929, p. 127, 130 ff.