Page 232 - Il 1916 Evoluzione geopolitica, tattica e tecnica di un conflitto sempre più esteso - Atti 6-7 dicembre 2016

232 il 1916. EvoluzionE gEopolitica, tattica E tEcnica di un conflitto sEmprE più EstEso

fashion, either frontally or by outflanking. If the enemy proved to be stronger,
fire was opened and reserves would be brought in from behind the skirmish
line. These were to replace losses in the skirmish line or become elements of
encirclement. This tactic would usually work if they were not too outnumbered
(at most two to one for the enemy). 23
A prepared attack on corps or army scale against a prepared enemy was a
different matter. The attacking divisions were deployed in three to four columns
to ensure that they would be ready to fight before the enemy was. This had the
added advantage that, should one of the columns meet the enemy, they could
already surround them while still in the deployment stage. Here the Russian ar-
my’s experience became all too clear, as their troops had set up strong covering
forces reinforced with machine guns. The attacking Austro-Hungarian troops
were thus forced to open out into full battle order relatively early. This meant
a shallower target for enemy artillery fire, but the premature reformation also
sapped the troops’ energy at an early stage. The deployed columns stormed
24
towards the enemy, as they had been instructed, the outnumbered enemy cov-
ering forces were quickly thrown back. However, due to the heavy casualties
caused by the frontal assault, the skirmish line reserves had to join the firing
line early. Russian resistance was fairly weak in the terrain in-between, and the
skirmish line was able to get quite close to the enemy’s main position. There
was heavy close-range fire from the Russian infantry and artillery at this point,
and the company commanders were forced to bring in the last of the reserves,
if there were any left at all. The companies then formed tight skirmish lines, as
set down in the regulations, in order to shock the enemy both physically and
psychologically with heavy fire before moving in to attack. The Russians fired on
the dense Austro-Hungarian skirmish lines with machine guns, which made ad-
vancing impossible and led to even more casualties. Next, the Russian artillery,
at extremely close quarters, opened fire with shocking precision. The skirmish
lines had taken cover about 500 yards from the enemy position to escape the
machine gun fire. In this position, though relatively safe from flat-trajectory fire,
they were hopelessly exposed to artillery shells and shrapnel. When they tried
to advance beneath the barrage, they were caught by the infantry fire. The
skirmish lines could no longer be employed tactically, as they were unable to

23 Pitreich, August von, Die Entwicklung unseres Kampfverfahrens vom Kriegsbeginn bis zur
Gegenwart. In: Militärwissenschaftliche Mitteilungen 1935, Hefte 1-10, Wien 1935, p. 410 f.
24 Pitreich, Max, Lemberg 1914. Grundprobleme des Krieges, Wien 1929, p. 130 f.