Page 236 - Il 1916 Evoluzione geopolitica, tattica e tecnica di un conflitto sempre più esteso - Atti 6-7 dicembre 2016

236 il 1916. EvoluzionE gEopolitica, tattica E tEcnica di un conflitto sEmprE più EstEso

this is where the Russians’ most important experience, gained in the Russo-Jap-
anese war, came into play. At the beginning of the war the Russian infantry
already dug in on principle, and was hardly visible. Their artillery was equally
well hidden. It was therefore extremely difficult for the observers to provide the
Austro-Hungarian batteries with clear targets. Most of the Austro-Hungarian ar-
tillery fire was therefore directed at supposed targets, and had no effect on the
enemy at all. If the infantry had to retreat, the artillery moved their batteries first
(unless they were left behind to cover the retreat), and at the crucial moment of
disengagement from the enemy, there was again almost no artillery support. 27
During the first battles of 1914 there was absolutely no tactical co-ordination
between the three main branches, infantry, cavalry and artillery. There could be
no overall plan as each branch assessed the Situation and the terrain according
to its own criteria. This was an aspect that had been insufficiently practised
during general manoeuvres. A remark in the General Staff publication that the
battles of September and October 1914 had been marked by “vacillation in
the choice of tactics and means” was certainly a euphemism. Apart from the
28
combat methods that were already in use and could not easily be replaced, the
term ‘battle doctrine’ can hardly be used for the phase of the war of movement.
If doctrine is understood to be normative conduct for all troops and means
employed for a specific tactical purpose within an overall plan, then the term
does not apply to the 1914 summer and autumn campaigns in the north-east
and in the Balkans. Although the commanding officers had regulations and
various handbooks to give instructions for their levels of command, ultimately
they made decisions on the spot based on their peacetime training. Concrete In-
formation on the deployment, employment and leadership of forces with precise
temporal and spatial norms and taking expected enemy behavior into account
(Austro-Hungarian tactics were employed in the different theatres of operations
regardless of specific topographical conditions) was only forthcoming in the
regulations of the later phases of linear and zonal tactics.
Senior commanders reacted to these obvious shortcomings in their own com-
bat methods by attempting to transmit the military leaders’ desire for victory
and destruction to the fighting troops and staffs. During the final years before
the war, the dominant idea of the ‘offensive at all costs’ had resulted in an

27 Pitreich, Max, Lemberg 1914. Grundprobleme des Krieges, Wien 1929, p. 138.
28 Österreich-Ungarns letzter Krieg, hg. Bundesministerium für Heerwesen und Kriegsarchiv, 7
Text- und 7 Kartenbände, Register, Wien 1930-1938, Bd. 1, p. 449.