Page 240 - Il 1916 Evoluzione geopolitica, tattica e tecnica di un conflitto sempre più esteso - Atti 6-7 dicembre 2016

240 il 1916. EvoluzionE gEopolitica, tattica E tEcnica di un conflitto sEmprE più EstEso

men and material on both sides were exhausted rather than by tactical consid-
erations. Combat regulations for both sides ordered that ground taken was to
be held at all costs. This meant that, depending on the time available, anything
from a small foxhole to complete trench systems were constructed, although the
trenches were limited to a single front line. The battles taking place evinced the
characteristics of siege warfare; permanent sapping and mining activity greatly
reduced the distance to be covered when assaulting the enemy. 35
This ‘one line’ tactic, although less strenuous than a war of movement, was
not the ideal solution, as commanding officers soon realised. While the main
objective during the phase of movement had been to attack or surround the
enemy - if successful this could either destroy large numbers of troops or at least
force them back - the danger now was that whole sections of the front might
have to be pulled back in the event of even the slightest breakthrough through a
line that could only be defended to the front. The clearly visible line was also an
easy target for artillery and trench mortars. Despite dugouts, the infantry crowd-
ed in the trenches suffered considerable losses to surprise and nuisance fire. 36
The changeover to static warfare required a shift in the existing doctrine of
attack, and after the spring of 1915 this could also be observed within the Aus-
tro-Hungarian army. The first time the new tactics were successfully employed
was at the breakthrough near Gorlice (in the Russian theatre) in May 1915.
There were certainly many reasons why the military elite were suddenly ready
to give up their strict adherence to the existing manual in favour of new methods.
The Austro-Hungarian army had hit an all-time low of only 516,000 (!) rifles (=
combat troops), with only 340,000 men on the north-eastern front (the Russian
theatre). The losses are astounding considering that 620,000 replacements had
been added to the 1.5 million soldiers mobilised at the beginning of the war. 37
The winter of 1914/15 had not proven to be a serious obstacle to the oper-
ative leadership style of Army Supreme Command, which did not confine itself
to defence during the ‘Carpathian winter’. They attempted occasional local at-
tacks, with more or less success, which did not, in the end, improve the tactical
position, but caused many losses and prevented the formation of reserves. The

35 Krauss, Alfred, Die Ursachen unserer Niederlage. Erinnerungen und Urteile aus dem Welt-
kriege, Wien 1920, p. 154 ff.
36 Pitreich, August von, Die Entwicklung unseres Kampfverfahrens vom Kriegsbeginn bis zur
Gegenwart. In: Militärwissenschaftliche Mitteilungen 1935, issues 1-10, Wien 1935, p. 505.
37 Österreich-Ungarns letzter Krieg, hg. Bundesministerium für Heerwesen und Kriegsarchiv, 7
Text- und 7 Kartenbände, Register, Wien 1930-1938, Bd. 2., Blg. 1.