Page 242 - Il 1916 Evoluzione geopolitica, tattica e tecnica di un conflitto sempre più esteso - Atti 6-7 dicembre 2016

242 il 1916. EvoluzionE gEopolitica, tattica E tEcnica di un conflitto sEmprE più EstEso

army was practically inoperative during the first months of 1915. When Ger-
man troops were transferred to the east from the west, this therefore had a very
positive effect on morale within the army, apart from the material advantage.
Despite the questionable condition of the army, officers and men were now
filled with optimism. This was mainly because the soldiers saw the catastrophic
defeats of the summer of 1914 as a result of the absence of German troops,
whose rear they had supported in the north-east as ‘true brothers in arms’. It
now seemed possible, with the help of their allies, to reverse the Situation in the
north-east. The German troops represented not only a reinforcement of equip-
ment and manpower, they also brought with them new tactics, based on their
experience in the West. Put simply, the new method of attack was split into two
phases: artillery preparation followed by infantry assault. After working with the
German army to plan the successful breakthrough near Gorlice in May 1915,
the Austro-Hungarian generals realised the need to adapt their own combat
methods to the model of German operations on the western front. This co-oper-
ation with the German army certainly encouraged staffs to rethink their tactics,
but there was another factor that helps explain the ease with which the new
doctrine was adopted. During the campaigns of 1914 a great many officers
were lost. These were mainly professional soldiers who had been trained long
before the war in the outdated peacetime ‘manoeuvre’ tactics and, due to unfa-
vorable conditions for promotion, were often quite old by the time they reached
command positions. The peacetime officers’ corps was decimated by death, in-
juries, retirement and dismissals. The vacant positions on all levels were quickly
filled by subalterns who moved up to the staffs, while their places were taken
by officers and military officials from the reserves. This not only meant a huge
increase in the number of staff officers with actual combat experience and the
adaptation of command methods to the real situation, but also brought the
civil expertise of a great many reserve officers into the army. These specialists,
coming from the reserves, were not impeded by excessive tactical training and
played an important part in revising the structure of the armed forces as well as
bringing the army up to date technologically. Apart from Army Supreme Com-
mand and most army headquarters, where there was little change in personnel,
officers were now not only younger, but more flexible.
‘Linear tactics’, which were already beginning to appear in spring 1915,
but were not laid down and incorporated into regulations until the autumn of
1915, required a complete reorganisation of combat methods, which meant
that both officers and men had to adjust considerably. The aim of linear tactics