Page 246 - Il 1916 Evoluzione geopolitica, tattica e tecnica di un conflitto sempre più esteso - Atti 6-7 dicembre 2016

246 il 1916. EvoluzionE gEopolitica, tattica E tEcnica di un conflitto sEmprE più EstEso

struction varied according to differing experiences and assessments within the
army. Some trenches were completely roofed over against artillery fire, whilst
others had only light shrapnel protection or were left open altogether. Covered
trenches were very popular with the troops as they afforded protection not only
against enemy fire, but also against the elements. Tactically, this kind of trench
had the disadvantage of limiting the range of friendly fire, and it was possible
for the enemy to overrun it. Initially, a shrapnel-proof roof that could quickly be
discarded for close combat was chosen as a compromise, but the fundamental
rule was ‘effect before protection’.
Standard instructions for the construction of gun positions in all theatres of
the war, from a foxhole to shell-proof dugouts and caverns, were finally issued
in the autumn 1915 manual “Anhaltspunkte für die Anlage von Kampfstellun-
gen” (‘Guide to the Construction of Battle Positions’). Trenches were to be built
allowing the widest range of fire as well as providing flank protection. Machine
guns were then positioned in so-called ‘enfilade trenches’, trenches that extend-
ed forwards so that the guns could be fired parallel to the main trench. A field
41
of obstacles was set up about 50 to 80 paces ahead of the trench to make an
approach to the position more difficult. These zones could be up to 80 metres
deep, depending on the materials and time available, and were filled with
barbed wire, trip-wires, pitfalls and branches as well as booby-traps improvised
from hand grenades. There are no existing regulations or handbooks on the
42
tactics or the type of combat that formed the basis of this linear system. Basical-
ly, the methods developed from experience became Standard procedure. After
the opening artillery barrage, which might last hours or even days, an assault
was mounted by the enemy against the first line of the first position, and this was
usually taken. The reserves in the second and third lines were either to launch
a counter attack and retake the first line, or seal off the enemy incursion. As the
reserves were too few in number to mount an effective counter attack, they could
usually only prevent the enemy from advancing further. The defending artillery
would then fire a barrage forwards to stop further enemy troops from advancing
to join the attack. The attacking infantry, unable to move to either side and so
closely engaged with their antagonists that artillery support was impossible,
could usually be thrown back by reserves from the second and third positions.
Unless a number of the attacking artillery batteries had been moved for-

41 Anhaltspunkte für die Anlage von Kampfstellungen, Wien 1915, P. 3.
42 Ibid. p. 8.