Page 244 - Il 1916 Evoluzione geopolitica, tattica e tecnica di un conflitto sempre più esteso - Atti 6-7 dicembre 2016

244 il 1916. EvoluzionE gEopolitica, tattica E tEcnica di un conflitto sEmprE più EstEso

was the same as that in the old manual, namely to hold on to every piece of
hard-won ground at all costs. The infantry, trapped in enemy fire, were to dig in
on the spot and construct dugouts to protect themselves against shells. A second
line was to be set up a hundred paces behind the first and a third, a hundred
paces further back. These three lines (all built to the same technical design)
formed the first Position. The lines were connected by communication trenches,
and the dugouts were to include quarters for all the trench soldiers. Although
38
the three lines were more easily defended and the depth of fortification put the
ground to better use, experiences during the Carpathian winter and the autumn
campaign of 1914 had shown that, even with this kind of depth, if the forces
were positioned too close together they could not withstand a concerted attack.
So in November 1915, Army Supreme Command called on armies to place
the second and third positions 2 - 3 km apart so that they could then block
any break in the front line. This deployment of men, which was already well
established on the German western front (the distances were calculated to cor-
respond to the range of British and French guns), had many advantages for the
Austro-Hungarian army. The enemy artillery could not bombard two positions at
the same time, and only very long range guns could reach the second Position.
The defending batteries, massed behind the second position, were able to cover
both positions with a barrage and without moving. The enemy would have to
break through at least 4 - 6 km (second and third positions) for an attack to be
effective at all. This meant not only surmounting around 350 paces of trench
system reinforced with all kinds of obstacles, but also overcoming small strong
points set up between the main trenches for all-round defence. 39
Although the main objective was to expand the first position, which was to
be able to repel an attack completely, there were hardly enough specialists, par-
ticularly sappers, engineers and laborers, to do the work, some of which was
highly technical. All the men stationed in the sector had to move earth, whether
they were infantry, cavalry, or part of the train. This was particularly hard for
the infantry in the line, who had to continue to build and maintain the trenches
whenever they were not actually involved in strenuous combat. Trench con-
40

38 Pitreich, August von, Die Entwicklung unseres Kampfverfahrens vom Kriegsbeginn bis zur
Gegenwart. In: Militärwissenschaftliche Mitteilungen 1935, issues 1-10, Wien 1935, p. 505.
39 Österreich-Ungarns letzter Krieg, hg. Bundesministerium für Heerwesen und Kriegsarchiv, 7
Text- und 7 Kartenbände, Register, Wien 1930-1938, Bd. 4, p. 134 f.
40 Pitreich, August von, Die Entwicklung unseres Kampfverfahrens vom Kriegsbeginn bis zur
Gegenwart. In: Militärwissenschaftliche Mitteilungen 1935, issues 1-10, Wien 1935, p. 508.