Page 238 - Il 1916 Evoluzione geopolitica, tattica e tecnica di un conflitto sempre più esteso - Atti 6-7 dicembre 2016
P. 238

238           il 1916. EvoluzionE gEopolitica, tattica E tEcnica di un conflitto sEmprE più EstEso


              overemphasis of the ‘will of the commander’, which then acquired too much sig-
              nificance during battle. Naturally, a commander’s subjective assessment of the
              Situation, coupled with the willpower and consistency to apply it accordingly,
              could help to win a battle, but these could never outweigh tactical factors such
              as the number of men, the artillery or the terrain.  The ‘iron will’ of the com-
                                                          29
              manding officers was demonstrated in macabre fashion on the battlefields in the
              north-east, where dead troops lay as they had fallen, lined up in parade-ground
              formation; their officers, sabres in hand, lay a few paces ahead”. 30
                Although combat methods in 1914 were largely based on the offensive and
              on mobility, the tactical Situation in some places required a temporary transfer
              to the defensive. Even the existing manual allowed for the use ‘of the spade’.
                                                                                  31
              According to the manual, the basic idea of ‘defence’ was to save forces or to
              recuperate for the next attack. By the autumn and winter of 1914 this was no
              longer an option,  as the troops were too exhausted to be of any use in an
                             32
              attack. It was now a question of keeping the troops and their equipment in one
              piece and not losing the ground they had already gained.
                The permanent fear of being surrounded or outflanked by the enemy, particu-
              larly in the Russian theatre, led to both sides instinctively constructing a continu-
              ous, evenly manned line or ‘permanent position’ that they constantly expanded
              in any way they could. The reserves behind the line were to be used for counter
              attack, as prescribed in the manual.  The Austrian reserves numbered too few
                                              33
              for this undertaking, so their function was reduced to that of a barrier. Action
              took the form of a battle for this line, to be held at all costs and using any means
              available. During these battles, the beginnings of a tactical doctrine developed,
              as Standard methods and co-ordinated combat operations were laid down for
              the infantry and the artillery (e.g. the combination of infantry and artillery fire
              to ward off an assault). 34
                In the Serbian theatre a form of static warfare was already beginning to
              emerge in the summer of 1914, although it was brought about by the fact that



             29  Pitreich, Max, Lemberg 1914. Grundprobleme des Krieges, Wien 1929, p. 155.
             30  Kiszling,  Rudolf,  Wandlungen  im  Angriffsverfahren  österr.-ung.  Fußtruppen  1914-1918,
                ÖSTA/KA NA B/800 n. 42, p. 8.
             31  Exerzierreglement für die k.u.k. Fußtruppen, Wien 1911, p. 215 f.
             32  Ibid. p. 215.
             33  Ibid. p. 224.
             34  Pitreich, August von, Die Entwicklung unseres Kampfverfahrens vom Kriegsbeginn bis zur
                Gegenwart. In: Militärwissenschaftliche Mitteilungen 1935, issues 1-10, Wien 1935, p. 502.
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