Page 234 - Il 1916 Evoluzione geopolitica, tattica e tecnica di un conflitto sempre più esteso - Atti 6-7 dicembre 2016

234 il 1916. EvoluzionE gEopolitica, tattica E tEcnica di un conflitto sEmprE più EstEso

move either forwards or backwards. Despite enemy fire, the troops remained
in captured territory, according to regulations. After holding out for several
hours, the lines began to crumble to the rear. At first, it was only the wounded
who dragged themselves away or were helped back, but soon more and more
soldiers were trying to escape the persistent, heavy artillery fire. Parts of the line
would fall back, only to be ordered back into position. Eventually, even the best
troops could no longer stand the psychological pressure of enemy fire raining
down on them with an intensity that they had never experienced before. In the
end, it was impossible to stop the soldiers from surging back, driven on further
by panic at rumors that the situation was even worse in neighboring sections of
the line and that they were in danger of being cut off. The retreat, when it was
finally ordered, afforded no protection against the artillery fire, which simply
moved with the retreating skirmish lines. Shells were falling directly onto the
lines with disastrous effects, and the troops rushed back in complete disorder. 25
The k.u.k. artillery meanwhile also followed the basic rules practised in pre-
war manoeuvres; it deployed openly (in the case of field gun batteries) and
joined the firefight by firing directly on known targets. The position and the di-
26
rection of fire were chosen by the commander of the deployed artillery unit, who
assessed the terrain and the targets and set up batteries according to his own
judgement. Although orders were given by a superior commander for the co-or-
dination of infantry and artillery in the first phase of the attack, there was no
communication at all between the attacking infantry and the artillery while the
battle was underway (no telephone connection with the infantry was planned
by organisation). The batteries sent out reconnaissance patrols and set up ob-
servers to correct the line of fire. Since the enemy infantry only opened fire at
close proximity, much later than expected, the Austro-Hungarian skirmish lines
were able to cover a great distance quite quickly and soon outran the range of
their own artillery. The artillery batteries were now too far away to support the
infantry attack and had to change position, which took up valuable time. This
meant that at the moment when the infantry reached the main enemy position
and artillery support was most needed, none could be provided. Once the
batteries were in their new positions, they fired according to artillery priorities.
The observers naturally directed artillery fire towards known enemy targets, and

25 Pitreich, Max, Lemberg 1914. Grundprobleme des Krieges, Wien 1929, p. 130 f.
26 Pitreich, August von, Die Entwicklung unseres Kampfverfahrens vom Kriegsbeginn bis zur
Gegenwart. In: Militärwissenschaftliche Mitteilungen 1935, Hefte 1-10, Wien 1935, p. 412.