Page 440 - Conflitti Militari e Popolazioni Civili - Tomo I
P. 440

440                                 XXXIV Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

              We can conclude that the population overcame the psychological barrier of active resist-
           ance against the Italian army sooner, However, as far as the German authorities were con-
           cerned, fear remained the most prominent element of the Slovenian attitude towards them –
           fear because of the brutality with which the German occupiers carried out their demographic
           relocation programme, and even greater fear due to the harsh German reaction to the forma-
           tion and actions of the rebels: they immediately started killing the civilian population by car-
           rying out executions on the spot of any subversive actions in the ratio of 10 people executed
           for every member of the German occupation force killed. Because of this, the resistance did
           not turn into a mass phenomenon. However, in December 1941 around 1000 men from the
           more remote parts of the Gorenjska region joined the rebel partisans; this was the first dis-
           tinctive people’s uprising in Slovenia.
              We should also bring the attention to something else. The violence that the occupying
           forces resorted to in order to suppress the resistance was severe, though not as extreme as in
           the east of Europe; nevertheless, the German occupiers managed to shoot 2700 rebels and
           members of the resistance movement, and they took around 16 000 people to the concentra-
           tion camps. In terms of percentages around 2 % of the population suffered in this manner
           under the German occupation. The Italian violence reached its peak in 1942 in the form
           of numerous war crimes against the civilian population in the operations of cleansing and
           internment of around 25 000 people, also a couple of thousand women and children, which
           means that around 8 % of the population in the occupation zone suffered directly.

           Vi.  The  division  of  the  Slovenian  population,  the  formation  of  collaboration  units  and
           their  use  in  the  struggle  against  the  resistance  movement  meant  further  deterioration  of
           the situation for the people. Namely, the resistance movement caused the reaction of the
           political forces, which had been in authority before the occupation, especially the Slovenian
           People’s Party, a Catholic and corporative party which had the support of around two thirds
           of the electorate. These forces started emphasizing the adverse effects of the resistance and
           equalling the resistance movement with communists in their propaganda. The violence of the
           resistance movement also contributed to the polarisation.
              Especially in the Italian occupation zone the opponents started organising themselves in
           the military sense, and in August 1942 the Italian occupation authorities legitimised the de-
           tachments of the resistance movement opponents, called the village guards, as their support-
           ing forces – called Milizia volontaria anticomunista. These forces soon equalled and even
           surpassed the number of the partisans, amounting to around 6000 troops.
              Now the population started dividing itself according to its political – personal – ideologi-
           cal l- genealogical definitions. The people who continued to be loyal to the resistance move-
           ment were not in an equal position. Above all, they were exposed to a much greater pressure,
           since the people around them knew about their orientation. The informing of the Italian au-
           thorities, which would mostly arrest such families and intern them into Italian concentration
           camps. All of this led to the war having an effect on villages and neighbours, while mutual
           control and denunciation became a constant of wartime life.
              This situation also continued after the Italian cease fire, since the German authorities also
           allowed and even promoted the activities of the collaborators’ formations in the Operation
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