Page 22 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo II

662 XXXIX Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

results or looking for information; lack of coordination in the use of the tanker aircraft,
etc., caused a flood of requests for information that didn’t help the war effort”. 14
But, on the other hand, “Jointness existed at the tactical level within the Argentine
forces during the conflict. In virtually every case it was the product of initiatives by mid-
15
level officers who put aside service parochialism to confront a common enemy”. “An
incipient jointness was improving logistics services, the Air Defense, and the Combat
Information and Operations Centers. Also, in the air bases where Naval and Air Force
squadrons operated together, “air units provided weapons and advised attack methods
16
to each other, and exchanged information. All was theirs, there was no difference”.
Unfortunately, such ad hoc efforts were too few and too late.

5. The ceopecon is created:
While the Argentine media in Buenos Aires trumpeted the successes of the air attacks
on British warships, the Junta met to assess the on-going military situation and the need
for better operational-level decision making. Building upon its decisions a week prior,
the Military Committee decided to place General Osvaldo García, who had commanded
rd
the initial invasion forces, back in charge on May 23 , with unified command below him
(at first), both for combat operations and logistics. Information and requests from sub-
ordinate commands would come through the Centro de Operaciones Conjuntas [Joint
Operations Center] (CEOPECON) to General García, ensuring that the Military Com-
mittee was kept informed. Military Committee approval of decisions wasn’t required,
but they would become involved in requests for additional resources and resolution of
major issues.
Guidance had been given to brigadier-general Menendez to maintain personal con-
tact with the operational commanders at the CEOPECON to ensure more fluid coopera-
tion among the services in defending the islands. Additionally, the Commander of the
South Atlantic Theater of Operations Command moved from Puerto Belgrano to Co-
modoro Rivadavia to preclude delays executing a defensive strategy. Moreover, it was
determined that General García, the most senior among the operational commanders,
would have the decisive voice in making operational-level decisions.
This Centre did not plan or conduct operations, but support for operational and lo-
gistical activities. Anyway, its members interpreted in different ways their faculties with
respect to the TOAS. In fact, the creation of the CEOPECON involved the TOAS dis-
solution, what was not fully and ultimately shared by all the members from COMIL and
CEOPECON.
In May 26th, under internal pressure by the home news showing the heroism of the
pilots of the Air Force in their attacks on British warships, and the sacrifice of the Navy
with the victims of the General Belgrano, the commander of the Fifth Army Corps,
asked Gen. Menéndez -without knowledge of the other members of CEOPECON- the

14 Mayorga, Horacio; p.342.
15 Scheina, Robert L.; “Argentine Jointness and the Malvinas”, JFQ, Summer 1994, p.95.
16 Mayorga, Horacio; p.342.