Page 21 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo II

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4. An un-chained command:
Undoubtedly, this lack of coordination at the top of the chain of command was to
affect the course of tactical actions on the Islands and the logistics, vital for a garrison
under the British naval blockade.
Since the beginning of the British naval bombardments, air support was incessantly
demanded to attack ships, because of the lack of coastal defence artillery with sufficient
range. It was a constant flow of dispatches, messages at times with intemperate tone
which did not receive the proper attention due the poor information provided or if the
mission was ordered, it was ineffective as there was no targets in the reported position.
Added to that was the inability of Lombardo to dispose directly the air assets, under the
orders of a parallel command to his, which ordered missions by itself without confirma-
tion or subordination.
General Menendez decided to raise the issue to his commander, Admiral Lombardo,
as the lack of reaction on ships bombarding shore positions, began to affect the soldier’s
morale, who felt increasingly powerless,
Admiral Lombardo understood him and said he was going to bring the matter to the
core of the Military Committee. But, the answer to Menéndez came instead through the
chief of the air component in the Malvinas, Brigadier Castellanos, who in turn had been
reported from the mainland by Brigadier Crespo, the FAS Commander, who had told
Castellanos that the issue had been discussed at the Military Committee and had arrived
at the conclusion that what Crespo had being doing was right, that the air combat power
was to be preserved for the decisive moment, which would be the British landings, and
would only be used by exception in the event of very profitable targets.
Facing this circumstance, Menendez wrote a message to Admiral Lombardo pointing
out that he had had an indirect and verbal response. He added that “if this was true, as
commander in the Malvinas, I understand that there are some things to clarify”. 11
th
On May 16 , 1982, Menéndez informed the Commander in Chief of the Army, about
the critical situation of the forces and staff under his command. “Two days after this
radio to Lombardo, I decided to make a full report for a better knowledge of the Com-
mander in Chief of the Army”. 12
“All these facts let to reflect the actual climate which began to be felt in the Argentine
High Command, diminished in its work by the lack of joint action, due the institutional
pride which stopped being subordinated to each other, and arose the deficiencies on the
defensive system of the Malvinas Islands “.
13
These circumstances had to be solved in anticipation of the British invasion, which
seemed imminent by mid-May. Lombardo recalls: “Disharmony had already done its
damage, and the vacated space was occupied instead by suspicion and mistrust. Any air-
craft failure at the last moment; delays in warm up times; errors in dispatches reporting

11 Túrolo, Carlos M.; “Malvinas – Testimonio de su Gobernador”, Editorial Sudamericana, Buenos Aires, 1983,
p.163.
12 Túrolo, p.164.
13 Mayorga, Horacio A.; “No Vencidos –Relato de las Operaciones Navales en el conflicto del Atlántico Sur”;
Editorial Planeta, Buenos Aires, 1988, p.347.