Page 19 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo II

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2. First setback:
Until the Argentine landings on the Malvinas on April 2nd, all had gone according
to plan for the Military Junta. Both the Malvinas and South Georgia were repossesed
with a minimal loss of life to themselves, and what was believed to be politically more
important, no loss of life to the British. Here, the military clock was supposed to have
stopped running, and the Argentine troops involved were to return to mainland.
But, as Clausewitz wrote in his “Principles of War”, “The conduct of war resembles
the workings of an intrincate machine with tremendous friction, so that combination
which are easily planned on paper can be executed only with great effort”. 2
The British government dispatched a Naval Task Force on April 5th, to recapture the
islands, so the Argentine plans had to be changed.
“As soon as the Military Junta had been warned of the British decision to break dip-
lomatic relations and send a naval task force to retake the islands, troop evacuation was
ordered halted and units were made ready to return to the theatre of operations. The deci-
sion, which was at odds with the original plans, denoted a change in the initial strategic
objective, which had been “Occupy in order to negotiate” to “reinforce in order to deter
Great Britain from retaking the islands by force, and then negotiate”. 3
“It could be supposed that since the initiative in retaking the islands had been Argen-
tina’s, its armed forces must have had sufficient warning for the approaching campaign.
It was not so. Contingency planning for use of the military option had been cloaked in
such secrecy that even Argentina’s intelligence service had been kept in the dark until
the last few hours prior to the landings in the islands”.
4
3. One commander, several commands:
“Once the strategic decision had been made to reinforce the Malvinas garrison, the
Military Junta decided to establish various operational commands in order to beef up the
defense of both the islands and the mainland. The Theatre of Operations Malvinas was
deactivated, and was established the Theater of Operations South Atlantic (“TOAS”)
command. It had the heaviest responsibility, for under it was the Malvinas military gar-
rison, whose task it was to consolidate positions and keep the islands from falling back
into British hands”. 5
On April 7th, General Galtieri signed Decree Nbr 700 establishing the TOAS and
designating Vice-admiral Lombardo as its commander, with authority to exercise all
functions except military governorship. Since then onwards, he had now to prepare the
military defense for the Malvinas.
“At the same time, the Strategic Air Command (“Comando Aéreo Estratégico”-
“CAE”) was established. Its mission was conceived as being more defensive in nature,
since Great Britain’s military reaction had yet to be recognized in all of its might. Major-

2 Von Clausewitz, Carl; “Principles of War”, Dover Publications Inc., New York, 2003, p.61.
3 Moro, Rubén O.; “The History of the South Atlantic Conflict – The War for the Malvinas”, Praeger, New
York, 1989, p.74.
4 Moro, O.; p.68.
5 Moro, O.; p.78.