Page 20 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo II

660 XXXIX Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

Brigadier Conrado Weber, who had been air operations commander, was appointed to
head the CAE. In turn, CAE established the Air Force South (“Fuerza Aérea Sur” -
“FAS”), which would be entrusted with the implementation of tactical missions, using
the Air Force’s available inventory of attack aircraft, which would be provided to FAS
on an as-needed basis”. 6
“Air defense of the mainland would be the responsibility of Air Command Defense
Zone South. TOAS would have both Malvinas Military Garrison and the high seas fleet
under its command, as well as the submarine force. The garrison would be commanded
by Brig. Gen. Mario Benjamín Menéndez, who established a joint command that in-
cluded the three main components, one of each service, of which the most significant
7
would be the land forces, which would have three infantry brigades assigned to it”.
“The FAS established its command post in the City of Comodoro Rivadavia and as-
signed its attack aircraft, parceling them out among the main airstrips and bases through-
out Patagonia”. 8
The newly appointed commander Lombardo recalls: “The means from the Argentine
Air Force on the continent would not be subordinated to me. Any necessary mission
requested, should be coordinated with them. Also, the National Strategic Reserve would
not be under my command. If necessary, I should ask for its deployment. Logistics
would be the responsibility of each of the Armed Forces”. 9
th
On April 12 , Lombardo’s headquarters issued Plan Esquemático Nbr 1/82 “S” –a
South Atlantic Theater of Operations Schematic (Operations) Plan with annexes that
outlined a general scheme for defense and provided tasks for component commanders.
Nevertheless, as the political level differences between the services tended to be un-
resolved, communications further down to the chain of command reflected independent
operations that spawned miscommunication, arguments, and confusion at the Opera-
tional Level.
It soon became a reality that each commander in chief in the Military Junta ordered
independently to his Armed Force, respectively.
Just a few examples of that, were the decision from the Army’s Commander in Chief,
General Galtieri, ordering two Infantry Brigades to cross from the mainland to the is-
lands without prior knowledge of the COMIL; the Navy’s Commander in Chief, Admiral
Anaya, ordering the Fleet to withdraw to coastal waters after the sinking of the cruiser
Belgrano, once again, without consulting the COMIL; and the Air Force Commander
in Chief, Brigadier Lami Dozo, with his planes not assembled or operated under a sin-
gle command, launching air attacks or deciding withdrawals from the Islands, without
knowledge of the others.
After the conflict, Lombardo expressed in his report: “How often in those days, I
recalled reading the history of the Pacific War during the Second World War, when U.S.
admirals complained about Mac Arthur and the Air Force”. 10

6 Moro, O.; p.78-79.
7 Moro, O.; p.79.
8 Moro, O.; p.79.
9 Lombardo, Juan José; “Malvinas: Errores, Anécdotas y Reflexiones”; unpublished edition, p.9.
10 Lombardo, Juan José; ob.cit., p.30.