Page 23 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo II

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planning of a major offensive action on the British beachhead in San Carlos. Menéndez
plan, made up with the participation and suggestions from the three services components
under his command, was finally rejected by the CEOPECON.
Anyway, with the British troops landed on the islands and next to Puerto Argentino,
the fate of the Argentine success was almost decided.
Finally, with the last ring of defenses around Puerto Argentino already fallen, on the
morning of June 14th, General Menendez sought contact the CEOPECON before mak-
ing his final determination. There was little interest to answer his call, so he finally ended
up talking with General Galtieri, who seemed oblivious to what was happening on the
battlefield. If Menendez had been on his own in the defense of the islands, for the deci-
sion to surrender the garrison, he would be even more alone.

6. Aftermath:
Just two weeks after the Argentine surrender on the islands, the Commander of the
FAS, submitted a report to the Commander of the Air Force, with the lessons learned
related to his command in the conflict.
Brigadier Crespo says in his report that “the actions of the three armed forces can
set the conclusion that there are three completely different forces, in terms of conception
and strategies related to the joint efforts” and that “the inability of the Air Force to gen-
erate a joint action, motivated every effort to be ultimately sterile and the heavy losses
in lives and material generated by his action, wasted”. 18
On December 2nd, 1982, the new Military Junta in charge ordered the creation of an
19
inquire commission on the political and military strategic liabilities over the command-
ing officers during the planning and the conflict evolution. The commission’s final
20
report, plus its documentary and the witnesses’ testimonies, known as the Rattenbach
Report, due to the general’s name presiding said commission, was opened in February
2012, by decision of the National Executive Power. 21
It should be noted that, in relation to joint doctrine, the commission said that “the
deficiencies observed on the jointness conduct, have resulted in a significant level and
demand for an urgent solution. The first joint action of the [Argentine] armed forces oc-
curred in this war with Britain. There are no previous records, of training operations or
major joint exercises. This has been a serious responsibility of the conducting officers
of this conflict”. 22

17 “The Army seems to have only an attitude of static defence which, should it continue indefinitely, will make
the men wilt in their own positions even before being able to engage in combat with the mass of enemy troops
… in your hands and in your future decisions rest the honour of the Argentine Army”.
18 Cardoso, O; Kirschbaum, R; and Van der Kooy, E.; “Malvinas - La Trama Secreta”; Editorial Sudamericana,
Buenos Aires, 2012.
19 Comisión de Análisis y Evaluación de las Responsabilidades del Conflicto del Atlántico Sur (“CAERCAS”).
20 Minutes of the Military Junta; December 2nd, 1982.
21 Decree Nbr. 200/2012.
22 Rattenbach Report, 870.