Page 24 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo II

664 XXXIX Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

The report continues: “In modern warfare, only the joint integration of the Armed Forces
allows the achievement of proposed military objectives. Therefore, this requires, a har-
monious, balanced and rational development adapted to the needs of modern combat of
the three Armed Forces. It matters little that any service acquires a potential or capacity
determined, if not accompanied by a similar development in the other services”. 23
“To solve this problem, it should become a primary responsibility of the highest au-
thorities of each service. It will be necessary, first, to mend fences, to define operational
areas, to develop joint doctrine, to conduct theoretical and practical exercises, to imple-
ment courses for the general staff and, crucially, to understand each and every one of
the members from an operational command, the mission and the fate of that command
are above all considerations of institutional order. Wars are won or lost by the Armed
Forces of a nation, not by this or that service. Modern warfare does not admit the pos-
sibility of the victory exclusively by a single service. Instead, the certainty of defeat is
there, if they act in watertight compartments”. 24
Finally, the Commission concludes that “The Joint General Staff is the key organiza-
tion to operate this transformation. This will require to prestige, enhance and giving to
it the most capable men each service can devote to it, according to their joint vocation,
officially accredited and qualified. A unique system of planning, and a joint war college,
plus demanding more careful observation and selection in this sense, should be the first
steps”. 25
The Rattenbach Report, was the basis for the prosecution to the proceedings before
the Armed Forces High Court, to establish the responsibilities of the main Argentine
commanders. 26
th
The final judgment on May 15 , 1986, condemned the members of the Military Jun-
ta, but noted out that “in their capacity as members of the Military Committee, they had
and exercised the responsibility of conducting the military strategic level, and affected
the operational strategy, creating situations that proved insuperable for strategic opera-
tional and tactical levels”. 27
The sentence continues: “The charge of lack of unity of command revealed, since
the beginning, on the occasion of the Working Group members being appointed and
instructed separately, and to have exposed their work and conclusions to each his Com-
mander in Chief separately. It was also true that each commander in chief ordered
his force independently. In the operational aspect, we conclude that the facts referred
harmed military operations, because undoubtedly involved efforts dispersion and loss-
es, with consequent operational disorder “.

23 Rattenbach Report, 871.
24 Rattenbach Report, 872.
25 Rattenbach Report, 873.
26 “Judging provisions of Decree No. 2971/83 dated November 11, 1983, of the alleged offenses under the
Code of Military Justice, and events mentioned in the report produced by the Commission for Analysis and
th
Evaluation of political and strategic responsibilities military Conflict in the South Atlantic War “. May 15 ,
1986.
27 Judgement, Paragraph 39th.