Page 25 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo II

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ActA
7. The road to jointness:
Despite all the efforts to work together, thoughout the fighting, the Argentine armed
forces rarely had a jointness vision of the conflict. In truth, the Argentine lack of “joint-
ness” was the rule among armed services in most of the world and not the exception.
“Jointness” was especially difficult for the Argentina armed forces, for they had found
themselves in opposite sides in the occasional inter-services feuds that arose following
World War II. Therefore, each Argentine armed force fought its own war against a more
unified British military machine, which also experimented similar problems, but had the
convenient speed to react and reach victory. Then, the Argentines were fully aware of
the price that was paid for this lack of jointness. It was the task of the following consti-
tutional governments to complete a radical change in the organization and structure of
the Armed Forces, and their jointness, drawing the lessons from the Malvinas conflict.
“In joint operations, the officers who grew up together, sharing a particular culture,
are found to have different manners, shapes, language and procedures of other cultures
that are unfamiliar, but rather difficult to understand. These cultural features on ground,
naval and air units are so tagged, that it is often easier to cross national borders with their
foreign colleagues, rather than between services of the same country”. 28
“For truly effective jointness, new institutional perspectives must evolve, and com-
mitment or it must work against the forces of history and tradition”. 29
So, in 1988 began a process to establish the functions for the Joint Staff of the Armed
Forces, with special competence in: a) The formulation of joint military doctrine b) De-
velopment of joint military planning c) The management of the joint military training
d) Control of strategic planning and operational effectiveness of joint military action. 30
Anyway, it was not until 2006 that the law was regulated by a series of decrees and
ministerial decisions, which led to the creation of the Joint War College of the Armed
Forces, as the military academic institution for the higher education for Senior Officers.
Its mission is to train the officers in conducting at the Operational Strategic level and
the development of the duties of general staff in the Strategic Operational and Strategic
levels, within the framework of military joint and joint-combined action, to optimize the
use of the Nation’s military arm, and professionals interested in perfecting national defense
through the development of graduate opportunities, research and extension activities.
Let me conclude with words of Maurice de Saxe, “Very few men occupy themselves
with the higher problems of war. They pass their lives drilling troops and believe that
this is the only branch of the military act. When they arrive at the command of armies
they are totally ignorant and, in default of knowing what should be done, they do only
what they know. One of the branches of the art of war, that is to say drill and the method
of fighting, is methodical; the other is intellectual. For the conduct of the latter it is es-
sential that ordinary men should not be chosen”. 31

28 Cushman, John H.; “Comando y Control de las Fuerzas en el Teatro de Operaciones”; Instituto de Publicaciones
Navales; Buenos Aires, 1985; p.99
29 Scheina, p.101.
30 Article 17, Law Nbr. 23.554.
31 Maurice de Saxe; “Reveries on the Art of War”; Dover Publications, Inc, Mineola, New York, 2007 edition;
p.119.